Impacts of Labor Market Programs: Comparison of Experimental and Non-experimental Methods by Munoz, Ana Teresa
  
Impacts of Labor Market Programs 
 
 
Comparison of Experimental and  
Non-experimental Methods  
 
Ana Teresa Muñoz Delgado 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Master Thesis at the Department of Economics 
Faculty of Social Sciences 
Master of Philosophy in Economics  
 
UNIVERSITETET I OSLO  
 
May 14, 2012  
 
 
II 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III 
 
 
 
 
IV 
 
Impacts of Labor Market Programs: 
Comparison of Experimental and Non-
experimental Methods 
 
 
  
V 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Ana Teresa Muñoz Delgado 
2012 
Impacts of Labor Market Programs: Comparison of Experimental and Non-experimental 
Methods 
Ana Teresa Muñoz Delgado 
http://www.duo.uio.no/ 
Trykk: Reprosentralen, Universitetet i Oslo 
VI 
 
Abstract 
 
This study compares experimental and non-experimental estimators using randomized data 
from the National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies. Our main question is: can non-
experimental methods match results obtained using random assignment? There are three key 
empirical conclusions from this study. First, results obtained using non-experimental data can 
lead to wrong conclusions about the causal effects of a training program. Second, biases 
obtained from non-experimental data depend not only on the econometric procedure used but 
also on the chosen comparison group. Third, comparisons longer ahead in time are more 
susceptible to selection bias problems. In other words, medium-run bias was larger than short-
run bias. 
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1 Introduction 
Unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity permeates the questions that we pose as 
economists and social scientists. In a seminal paper, LaLonde (1986) used a randomized 
experiment to evaluate the empirical models used to estimate the impact of labor market 
programs. His results revealed that many of the econometric procedures used at that time to 
evaluate employment and training programs would not have yielded accurate or precise 
estimates of the impact as observed in randomized trials. In particular, even when the 
econometric estimates pass conventional specification tests, they still fail to replicate 
experimental results. LaLonde suggests that policymakers should be aware that non-
experimental evaluations may contain large and unknown biases resulting from specification 
errors. The study had a profound impact on empirical economics, and since it was published a 
large body of theoretical and empirical work has developed methods that aim to more 
effectively eliminate or reduce the biases created by specification errors. Studies similar to 
LaLonde (1986) have since been used to evaluate the biases inherent in these methods, 
finding that non-experimental estimates are often sensitive both to the particular analysis 
sample and to the econometric procedure. 
In the last decades, different econometric methods have been developed in order to meet the 
requirements of program evaluation. While randomized trials keep being the first best 
solution when calculating impacts of training programs, researchers have also developed 
econometric procedures that control for observable and unobservable characteristics. These 
methods have been particularly useful since randomized data are not easy available. However, 
it is also important to evaluate and compare the performance of these different procedures in 
order to identify their strengths and weaknesses. Along these lines, our goal is to reevaluate 
LaLonde’s results (1986) using data from the National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work 
Strategies. 
In this study, we start by reviewing the context where welfare-to-work reforms arose in the 
United States. Under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
1
, a federally funded cash 
welfare program was created in order to protect children who were deprived of parental 
support. After the Family Support Act was passed in 1988, permanent welfare payments were 
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 In 1935, the Social Security act established a state-level grant called Aid to Families with Dependent Children. 
This program was in effect until 1996.  
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replaced by temporary assistance, where parents were expected to be the main supporters of 
their children. In addition, a mutual obligation between states and welfare-recipients was 
created. States were responsible for providing support to help welfare recipients to find 
employment, while recipients were responsible for taking jobs and participating in the Job 
Opportunities and Basic Skills Training program.  
The National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies was a study undertaken in seven 
locales, in order to measure the impacts of these mandatory welfare-to-work programs created 
following the guidelines imposed by JOBS. At each site, individuals were randomized into a 
control or treatment group, and their outcomes were followed for a period of five years after 
random assignment. Control group members were not subject to sanctions and could 
participate in any activities or services that were available before the implementation of the 
program. Treatment group members were expected to participate in the activities assigned by 
the program, at the risk of losing welfare payments if they did not participate. 
Our empirical analysis uses NEWWS data covering female sample members with two years 
of earnings data prior to random assignment, in three sites: Grand Rapids, Portland and 
Riverside. In order to measure the impacts of welfare-to-work programs on earnings, we use 
experimental and non-experimental methods. Specifically, we start by calculating the 
difference of means by treatment status using randomized data. In this approach, average 
earnings for control group members are compared to average earnings for treatment group 
members, within the same site. Following LaLonde (1986), we then use alternative 
econometric models to estimate the impact of labor market programs, where we use non-
experimental features of the data. By comparing control group members from one site 
(control group) to control group members from another site (comparison group), we may 
evaluate the bias that would arise from non-randomized comparisons. First, we consider 
selection on observable characteristics, using regression methods and propensity-score 
matching. Second, we consider selection on unobservables by using a differences-in-
differences estimator.  
Selection on observables is obtained in both methods by including covariates reflecting 
earnings prior to randomization, employment prior to randomization and background 
characteristics. In propensity-score matching, we follow the subclassification method 
employed by Michalopoulos et al. (2004). Individuals are divided in subgroups with similar 
characteristics based on their propensity scores and then, a bias is calculated from each 
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comparison between the control group and the comparison group. The total bias arising from 
the comparison between the two sites is therefore a weighted average of the biases from each 
subgroup. 
Differences-in-differences estimators are used in order to control for selection on 
unobservables. The main goal is to estimate the causal effect of program participation on 
earnings without considering possible fixed effects that are not related to the treatment, also 
known as common trends. 
We might summarize the insights from our research with three main conclusions. First, results 
obtained using non-experimental data can lead to wrong conclusions about the causal effects 
of a training program. Second, biases obtained from non-experimental data depend not only 
on the econometric procedure used but also on the chosen comparison group. Third, 
comparisons longer ahead in time are more susceptible to selection bias problems. In other 
words, medium-run bias was larger than short-run bias. 
As a concluding remark and a recommendation for future research, our study suggests the 
potential of the evaluation and comparison of distributional estimators. 
The outline of the thesis is as follows. Section 2 reviews the context where all these reforms 
arose, explains the characteristics of the different training programs and reviews previous 
literature. Section 3 outlines the empirical strategies. Section 4 describes the data and sample 
used. Section 5 explains the implementation of the econometric procedures. Section 6 
presents the results obtained and section 7 considers the concluding remarks.   
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2 Context 
The first part of this section reviews the political context where welfare reform programs 
arose in the United States. Starting in 1935, the main lines of Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) program will be explained. Then, we will continue by explaining the main 
reforms imposed to AFDC by the Family Support Act of 1988. To finish this subsection, we 
will talk about the main characteristics of the Jobs Opportunities and Basic Skills Training 
(JOBS) program and its link to the National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies 
(NEWWS) and our research. 
The second part explains in more detail the National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work 
Strategies and the two main approaches used: Labor Force Attachment and Human Capital 
Development. In addition, participation patterns for control and treatment group members will 
be explained. 
The third part of this section reviews the previous literature on the topic. 
2.1 Context
2
 
In 1935, the Social Security act established a state-level grant program called Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC). This program aimed to protect children who were 
deprived of parental support, through the provision of cash welfare payments. Absence of one 
of the parents, incapacitation, death or unemployment, were some of the reasons leading to 
welfare support. The AFDC became the major federally funded cash welfare program in the 
United States and it was in effect until 1996, under the administration of the Department of 
Health and Human Services. 
Later on, welfare reform legislation was passed by the US Congress in 1988. The Family 
Support Act (FSA) revised the AFDC program to emphasize work, child support and family 
benefits.  
The basic entitlement nature of the AFDC program was not modified by the FSA; however 
the main focus was on shifting balance from permanent to temporary income maintenance. 
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 The discussion in this section is based largely on Gueron (1990), Gueron (1991) and Office of Human Services 
Policy (1998).  
5 
 
According to the FSA, parents should be the main supporters of their children and 
government assistance should encourage grant recipients to move off welfare. A mutual 
obligation between recipients and government was established. 
On the one hand, states were responsible for providing incentives and support services to help 
welfare recipients to find employment. On the other hand, recipients were responsible for 
taking jobs and participating in the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training (JOBS) 
program created under the FSA.  
States were expected to guarantee support services as child care, if those were necessary for 
an individual’s employment or education. Furthermore, the participation in governmental 
programs could not be mandatory if these services were not provided.  
States were also required to provide transitional benefits such as Transitional Child Care 
(TCC) and Transitional Medicaid Assistance (TMA), in order to help former welfare 
recipients in their transition to self-support. The TCC and TMA programs provided 12 months 
of supportive services to former recipients complying with two requirements. Firstly, 
individuals were only eligible for transitional services if they lost benefits because eligibility 
limits were exceeded. Some of the reasons leading the income to exceed the limits were: an 
increase in salary, an increase in the number of hours worked or the expiration of an income 
disregard. For example, earnings of AFDC recipients were subject to earned income 
disregards for a maximum of one year, when calculating the welfare grant. Secondly, 
individuals were required to have received assistance for at least three out of the previous six 
months prior to losing benefits.  
Some other related AFDC amendments stated by the FSA were: increased disregards for 
earned income and increased disregards for child care. Earned income disregards were 
defined as the amount of monthly earned income an AFDC recipient may keep before the size 
of the AFDC benefit is reduced. Disregards for child care were considered as the amount of 
earnings that could be set aside for child care before the size of the grant is reduced. 
As mentioned, recipients were responsible for participating in Job Opportunities and Basic 
Skills Training Program (JOBS), created under the Family Support Act of 1988. More 
specifically, welfare recipients were provided with education and job search activities, and 
required to participate as a condition of receiving AFDC grants.  
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JOBS was a training program designed to increase welfare recipients’ job skills and 
opportunities. There were two main variations of JOBS: Labor Force Attachment which 
emphasized the rapid acquisition of employment and Human Capital Development which 
promoted longer-term education and job training.  
The Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training Program (JOBS) required most single 
parents with children ages one to five, to enroll in welfare-to-work programs. Moreover, the 
enrollees were required to participate in these activities for as long as they received welfare 
grants and were eligible for services. 
States were allowed to design their own programs and JOBS would provide federal matching 
funds for welfare-to-work initiatives. In other words, JOBS’ performance requirements 
offered states incentives and opportunities to choose the best service methods according their 
own situation. As mentioned by Michalopoulos et al. (2004): “states were required to spend at 
least 55% of JOBS resources on potential long-term welfare recipients or on members of 
more disadvantaged groups, including those who had received welfare in 36 of the prior 60 
months, those who were custodial parents under age 24 without a high school diploma or 
GED, those who had little work experience, and those who were within two years of losing 
eligibility for welfare because their youngest child was 16 or older”. 
From the welfare recipients’ perspective, JOBS was considered a mix between conservative 
and liberal elements: participation requirements, child care guarantees and investments 
focused on improving the self-sufficiency of AFDC mothers. 
In contrast to previous programs, JOBS emphasized education to a larger extent. The 
provision of education to any adult on AFDC who lacked a high school diploma or did not 
demonstrate basic literacy was a requirement. In addition, states were also expected to provide 
job skills training, job placement services and two of the following: group or individual 
assistance in locating a job (job search), on-the-job training, or community work experience 
(workfare). JOBS also introduced the “learnfare” provision, which required teenage custodial 
parents to participate in educational activities. 
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2.2 National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work 
Strategies (NEWWS)
3
 
The National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies was a study undertaken by the 
Department of Health and Human Services. The main objective was to measure the impacts 
of eleven mandatory welfare-to-work programs that were created following the guidelines 
imposed by JOBS. These programs were developed in seven locales, each of them having 
specific characteristics determined by their designers: Atlanta, Georgia; Columbus, Ohio; 
Detroit and Grand Rapids, Michigan; Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Portland, Oregon; and 
Riverside, California. The evaluation measures the impacts of the programs by comparing the 
outcomes for a treatment group to the outcomes for a control group. Individuals are randomly 
assigned into the treatment or control group, and those belonging to the treatment group are 
subject to program requirements. Under JOBS provision, states were free to design the 
programs as long as they met the provision’s requirements. Three particular states (Atlanta, 
Grand Rapids and Riverside) used two different approaches for the treatment group and then 
compared the results to the control group. The human capital development approach focused 
on providing education services, so individuals could get access to better jobs by having a 
high-school diploma or a degree. The labor force attachment approach prioritized 
occupational training and quick entry into the labor market, so individuals would gain work 
experience and use these skills as a stepping stone to better jobs. In one state, Portland, a 
welfare-to-work program was created mixing services as job search, education and training, 
and work experience activities.  
For all sites, access to activities and requirements are the two main aspects that differentiate 
treatment group members from control group members. For example, control group members 
are not eligible for special program services (program being evaluated), but they are eligible 
for all other employment and training services in the community, as well as for all basic 
welfare benefits. In the three sites under study, it was observed control group participation in 
activities as: job search, basic education, college, vocational training and work experience or 
on-the-job training. With respect to requirements, neither requirements of participation in 
activities nor sanctions for noncompliance were imposed over control group members. In 
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 The discussion in this section is based largely on Freedman et al. (2000), Hamilton et al. (1997), Hamilton et al. 
(2001) and Scrivener et al. (1998). 
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contrast, all AFDC recipients part of the treatment group were required to participate if they 
had access to child care. 
In the remaining of this subsection, we will explain the main differences between the 
activities that treatment and control group members participated in. The three first subsections 
will focus on the Labor Force Attachment approach, Human Capital Development approach 
and Portland’s employment-focused program, respectively. The last two subsections will 
explain the participation patterns for treatment and control group members.  
2.2.1 Labor Force Attachment Approach (LFA) 
The LFA program begins with job search activities, followed by short-term education and 
training only for those unable to find employment during job search. If necessary, individuals 
were encouraged to use the first job as a stepping stone in order to get a better work 
opportunity later. 
There were a number of activities considered as part of the LFA approach. As mentioned 
earlier, each stage had as goal to help individuals to get a job. In case individuals didn’t 
succeed or the time limits of the program run out, participants would be placed into the next 
stage of the program. Let’s review each of these stages:4 
Job Club: this program lasted between three and five weeks, where the two main components 
were classroom instruction and phone room. In this stage, clients were taught how to find job 
leads and fill job applications, how to write a resume and a cover letter, how to conduct an 
interview, and how to value their talents. Classroom instruction lasted between one week 
(Riverside, including an in-depth comparison of welfare and earned income) and two weeks 
(Grand Rapids, including career exploration). Clients participated in these classes from 15 to 
30 hours per week depending on the site under evaluation. In addition, participants were 
expected to show up on time to classes and come dressed as they would for a job. The phone 
room segment came after the classroom instruction and the goal was to improve clients’ job-
seeking skills by calling potential employers, getting interviews and writing job applications. 
The sites provided a wide variety of support services in order to help clients to find jobs. For 
example, telephones were available at each site so that participants could call employers and 
                                                 
4
 For more details, see Appendix Figure A.1.  
9 
 
receive messages. Classified advertisement sections from newspapers, telephone directories 
and job announcements were also available at JOBS offices. 
Individual job search: this section lasted from three to five weeks per year. Clients were 
required to look for employment by themselves, write down the names of the companies they 
had contacted and report their progress each week to the staff. The number of employer 
contacts required was dependent on individual characteristics and it was determined by 
program staff. As mentioned earlier, individual search was the second stage in the program 
and it was provided to individuals who did not find job after completing job club. The length 
of the two first stages combined, job club and individual job search, was eight weeks 
maximum per year.  
Basic education or vocational training: this stage lasted nine months maximum. Basic 
education services were provided to clients who did not have a high school diploma or a GED 
certificate. In Riverside, these services were provided to clients who possessed these 
credentials but with low scores. Individuals were assigned to four major types of classes 
based on their achievements: high school completition, General Education Development 
(GED), Adult Basic Education (ABE) and English as a Second Language (ESL). In Grand 
Rapids, vocational training was available with short programs generally leading to a 
certificate of credit. 
Work experience: it lasted from three to six months and included three types of positions. 
Firstly, unpaid work was the most common work experience where individuals were assigned 
to public or private non-profit sectors. Secondly, it was also offered on-the-job training in the 
private sector with a wage subsidized by the client’s welfare grant. Thirdly, paid work was 
also an option usually in the form of college work-study positions. Unpaid work experience 
positions were developed by JOBS staff and clients were normally assigned after completing 
job club or other activities without finding work.  
2.2.2 Human Capital Development Approach (HCD) 
The HCD program begins with longer-term education and training, generally lasting up to two 
years. Job search and vocational training activities may be assigned if clients do not find 
10 
 
employment through their education and training program, or on their own initiative. Let’s 
review the stages:
5
 
Basic education: this stage lasted from six months to one year and it was quite similar to the 
one considered in the labor force attachment approach. Basic education services were 
provided to clients who did not possess a high school diploma or a GED certificate. In 
Riverside, clients who possessed these credentials but with low scores were required to 
participate in these services. As before, there were four major types of classes: high school 
completition, General Education Development (GED), Adult Basic Education (ABE) and 
English as a Second Language (ESL). 
Vocational training or college: this stage lasted up to two years. Individuals who wanted to 
participate in training programs or get an academic degree started here. The principal 
providers of vocational training were public schools and community colleges, among others. 
In Grand Rapids, vocational training included different training programs as: automotive 
maintenance and repair, business and clerical occupations, cabinet and furniture making, 
computer programming, cosmetology, electronics, nursing, refrigerator repair, and truck 
driving. Most of these programs lasted between one and two years, where one-year degrees 
led to a certificate of credit and two-year programs led to an undergraduate academic degree. 
College enrollment was limited to clients who could complete an associate’s degree6 within 
two years. In Riverside, clients were not allowed to obtain vocational training unless they had 
enrolled on their own initiative before random assignment. 
Work experience: this stage lasted from three to six months. Individuals preferring work 
experience started here. As mentioned earlier, this stage included three types of positions. The 
first and most common type was unpaid work in the public or private non-profit sectors. The 
second type was on-the-job training in the private sector where a wage subsidized by the 
client’s welfare grant was usually offered. The third type was paid work experience, normally 
in the form of college work-study positions.  
Job search: it lasted up to eight weeks per year. The activities were quite similar to those 
experienced by the LFA treatment group and it included job club plus individual job search. 
                                                 
5
 For more details, see Appendix Figure A.2. 
6
 An associate’s degree is an undergraduate academic degree lasting normally two years and awarded by 
community colleges, technical colleges and bachelor’s degree-granting colleges and universities.  
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2.2.3 Portland’s employment-focused program 
The program implemented in Portland followed an employment-focused approach, having 
employment as the primary goal. Portland’s program emphasized full-time jobs that paid 
more than the minimum wage, included benefits and offered room for advancement. There 
was also heavy focus on job development and placement activities. Furthermore, the strategy 
was to provide a mix of different services to participants: job search, education and training, 
and work experience activities. In other words, the strategy was to provide a blend of strong 
LFA elements and moderate HCD elements.  
As in other states, program group members attended a group JOBS orientation immediately 
following skills testing. Clients were selected by managers to attend two different service 
tracks: fast track or enhanced track. Selection was based on a variety of factors as 
employment history, educational status and personal goals. Clients that were ready to look for 
a job were placed in the fast track. In this track, clients participated in activities as job club 
and job search. The enhanced track included clients that were not ready to enter the labor 
market. For this reason, clients in the enhanced track participated in life skills training classes 
and basic education classes instead. 
In the rest of this subsection, we will explain briefly the main activities:
7
 
a) Job Club / Job Search: consisted of 30 hours of classes per week during a period of 
two weeks. Some of the topics discussed were: career goals, resume preparation and 
videotaped practice interviews. 
b) Individual job search: this activity took place right after job search. Clients were 
allowed to use resource rooms and were sometimes assigned to a staff member who 
monitored and assisted them in their search. 
c) Life skills training: this four- to five-weeks class involved examination of work 
history and vocational interests. The main goal was to prepare people for work and 
eventual self-sufficiency. 
d) Basic education: basic education services were provided primarily to clients who did 
not have a high school diploma or GED. For example, a six-week GED class was 
                                                 
7
 For more information, see Appendix Table A.1 and Appendix Table A.2. 
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provided to individuals missing the GED test in social studies, literature, science, 
mathematics or writing. Clients whose achievements were lower than what is required 
for high school completition were assigned to Adult Basic Education (ABE).  
e) Work experience: considered activities as unpaid work in the non-profit and private 
sector, on-the-job training in the private sector and paid work. Participation was 
voluntary in unpaid positions, and positions lasted a maximum of three months. 
2.2.4 Participation patterns for treatment group members 
AFDC recipients are exposed continuously to a decision-making process, where welfare 
payments are contrasted to labor earnings. More specifically, treatment group members can 
decide between participating in JOBS activities and continue receiving AFDC payments, or 
not participate in the mandatory activities and receive grant sanctions. As expected, the 
decision will depend on the gains obtained from each alternative. Since the impacts of a 
program are commonly measured as the average effect over the sample population, non-
compliers will decrease the average effect of a training program. For this reason, it is of 
interest to understand clearly the mechanism behind the decisions of treatment group 
participants.  
When mapping the decisions of program participants,
8
 the first step is to identify all the 
different options or decision nodes that a treatment group member has. The second step is to 
identify the gains obtained from following each path. The third step is to check if there are 
any “dominated” strategies, meaning if there is any path that would never be followed by an 
individual because it leads to low gains. After clarifying all the paths, you can set incentives 
or sanctions in order to motivate an individual to follow a determinate path, i.e., exit welfare. 
In this subsection, we will explain briefly all the different tracks that can be followed by a 
treatment group member and then explain in some detail the three main tracks.  
For individuals participating in training activities, two main tracks can be followed: 
employment leading to exit from AFDC and no exit from AFDC.
9
 Individuals exiting AFDC 
receive 12 months of transitional services and are still eligible to receive food stamps. 
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 For more details, see Appendix Figure A.3 and Appendix Table A.3. 
9
 Exit from AFDC is defined as two consecutive months of zero payments recorded on the state AFDC 
administrative records system. 
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Individuals that do not exit AFDC and JOBS participation continues being mandatory, have 
two main options: to be employed and receive welfare payments or to continue participating 
in JOBS activities without being employed. As mentioned, the final decision of getting a job 
or continuing on welfare will depend on the incentives of each option.  
Individuals that decided to not participate in activities and that JOBS participation is still 
mandatory are exposed to sanctions or reductions in welfare payments such as cash, food 
stamps and Medicaid.    
The three main decision paths followed by treatment group participants in Grand Rapids, 
Portland and Riverside are the following: 
Individuals that exit from AFDC: Clients moving from welfare to work through exit from 
AFDC, would stop receiving AFDC benefits but could still be eligible to receive food stamp 
benefits. In addition, individuals would receive 12 months of transitional assistance such as 
transitional Medicaid (TMA) and transitional child care (TCC). Explaining in more detail, 
exit from AFDC is defined as 2 consecutive months of zero payments recorded on the state 
AFDC administrative records system and occurs when individuals get monthly earnings over 
$793 in Riverside and over $564 in Grand Rapids. States tried also to expand eligibility for 
transitional Medicaid and child care program through the approval of transitional assistance 
waivers. 
Individuals who are employed but still AFDC eligible: Individuals who started working but 
did not get enough earnings to exit from AFDC could get two different types of benefits: 
income disregards and food stamps. According the United States Department of Health and 
Human Services:  
“Under the AFDC rules, all recipients who worked were entitled to a $90 work 
expense disregard. In addition, for the first four months of AFDC receipt, the next $30 
of earned income, plus one-third of the remainder, was disregarded in calculating 
eligibility and benefits. After four months and until one year, only the $30 disregard 
continued. After one year, there was no earned income disregard. This meant that after 
one year of AFDC receipt, if a recipient got a job, her grant amount was reduced by 
one dollar for every dollar that she earned above the amount set aside to cover her 
work expenses”. 
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Earned income disregards were created in order to help individuals in their transition to 
employment. However, the termination of income disregards removed the incentives to work. 
In other words, without income disregards, welfare payments would be replaced by earnings, 
keeping total income almost constant. For this reason, many states approved income 
disregards waivers starting 1992, affecting the whole welfare recipient population in the 
periods and sites of interest. For example, the state of California (Riverside) adopted flat 
earnings disregard of $120 and a percentage earnings disregard of 33.33%, starting in October 
1992. The state of Michigan (Grand Rapids) adopted a flat earnings disregard of $200 plus a 
percentage earnings disregard of 20%, starting also in October 1992. The state of Oregon 
(Portland) increased gross income limits to 130% of federal poverty guideline for JOBS Plus 
participants, starting in July 1995.  
In the case of food stamps, grant calculations count a dollar of earnings less than a dollar of 
AFDC, so a person that replaces welfare dollars with earnings may experience a net increase 
in food stamps. The food stamp benefit level is calculated by considering the maximum 
benefit level minus one-third of a household’s countable income. The countable income 
includes 100% of AFDC payments but only 80% of earnings, so an individual who replaces 
AFDC with earnings could lower her countable income and increase her food stamp 
payments. On the other hand, it is also possible that a recipient might decrease or completely 
lose food stamps benefits if earning gains are relatively large. 
Non-compliers receiving sanctions: Even though states were allowed to design their own 
programs, federal JOBS regulations governed the enforcement rule and sanctioning process 
nationwide. As mentioned by Hamilton et al. (1997), the penalty for noncompliance was 
removal of the JOBS-mandatory client from the AFDC grant. For example, in case that the 
parent failed to participate, the AFDC grant was reduced so only the children were covered. 
Sanctions were to continue until the sanctioned individual complied with the participation 
mandate, with a minimum sanction length of one month for the first “offense”, three months 
for the second, and six months for the third and subsequent offenses. For a three-person 
family in 1993, a sanction would have resulted in an $88 decrease in a monthly grant of $474 
in Grand Rapids. In Portland, a sanction would have resulted in a $142 decrease in a monthly 
grant of $460 and in Riverside, a sanction would have resulted in a $120 decrease in a 
monthly grant of $624 (Hamilton et al., 1997; Scrivener et al., 1998). 
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2.2.5 Participation patterns for control group members 
As mentioned, the main differences between treatment and control group members are access 
to activities and requirements of participation. Control group members could not enter the 
program being evaluated but could receive any services that existed prior to the introduction 
of the JOBS program. In addition, neither participation requirements nor sanctions were 
imposed over control group members. These two main characteristics alter the gains obtained 
from each decision track. However, we will describe to some extent the three main tracks
10
: 
Individuals that exit from AFDC: Control group members moving from welfare to work 
would receive the same services as treatment group members. Individuals would have access 
to transitional Medicaid and child care services for up to 12 months. In addition, they could 
still be eligible to receive food stamp benefits, depending on the earnings level. 
Individuals who are employed but still AFDC eligible: Control group members employed and 
on AFDC, would receive the same benefits as treatment group members. Income disregards 
and food stamps would be provided in case of eligibility. 
Individuals who still continue on AFDC: Since control group members were neither subject to 
requirements nor to sanctions, individuals could choose to not participate in any activities and 
still continue on AFDC. 
2.3 Literature Review 
Most studies have tended to focus on one type of estimators, experimental or non-
experimental, while a smaller part of the international research has evaluated non-
experimental estimators’ performance against randomized results. However in the last 
decades, this tendency has been changing, emphasizing a comparison between methods 
instead. In his seminal paper, LaLonde (1986) developed the idea of evaluating econometric 
procedures, where results obtained using non-randomized data were compared to results 
arising from random-assignment. This idea is followed in our study.  
One of the earliest papers published on the historical progression of the welfare reforms in the 
United States, measures the impacts using the difference of the average outcomes by 
treatment status specification (Gueron, 1990). In other words, average outcomes of program 
                                                 
10
 For more details, see Appendix Figure A.4. 
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participants were compared to average outcomes of non-participants. Later on, this method 
was also applied to the NEWWS data set, obtaining experimental estimators where programs’ 
and sites’ performance were compared (Hamilton et al., 1997; Scrivener et al., 1998; 
Freedman et al., 2000; Hamilton et al., 2001). Normally, impacts of training programs were 
measured as a change in labor earnings and employment status experienced by the program 
participant. However, the field of program evaluation has also extended to measuring the 
impacts of training programs on child outcomes (Hamilton et al., 2001). It has been widely 
accepted that also the families of welfare recipients are affected by policy reforms. 
Other econometric methods, as differences-in-differences estimators, were used when 
calculating the impacts of a mandatory program in the United Kingdom (Blundell et al., 
2004). Moffitt (2002) showed empirically that the impacts of labor market reforms in the 
United States can have opposite effects. In other words, the mean impacts of a labor market 
reform may average together positive and negative labor supply responses, possibly obscuring 
the extent of welfare reform’s effects.  For example, the TANF program impacts on the 
bottom of the distribution were significantly different to average impacts, suggesting the 
potential for distributional estimators (Moffitt, 2008). It was also proved that the program had 
positive impacts on employment levels but no impact on income levels, given that increased 
earnings were cancelled out by the loss in welfare benefits.  
Inspired by the seminal work of LaLonde (1986), a number of studies have applied 
randomized experiments to evaluate the empirical models used to estimate the impacts of 
labor market programs (Michalopoulos et al., 2004; Greenberg et al., 2005). Michalopoulos 
and colleagues (2004) report short run and medium run biases obtained using propensity-
score matching methods and compare their results to Freedman et al. (2000). The analysis 
uses NEWWS data set and indicates, among other conclusions, that the estimated medium run 
bias is larger than the short run bias. Using a slightly different data set and meta-analysis 
instruments, Greenberg et al. (2005) explain why Riverside and Portland’s programs 
performed better than the programs assessed in other sites. They conclude that the superior 
performance of the programs is only partly attributable to the design of these programs with 
focus on job search and sanctions. Furthermore, they indicate that caseload characteristics 
might be more important when achieving success. 
Section 3 will review the empirical strategies or methods used to calculate the impacts of the 
programs in the different sites.   
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3 Empirical Strategy  
As mentioned previously, our goal is to estimate the impacts of welfare-to-work programs. 
Predicting this causal relationship allows foreseeing the effects of different programs or 
circumstances, so policy makers can make better decisions. For example, the causal effect of a 
training program is the increment to earnings an individual would receive if she participated 
in the services associated to this program. The ideal procedure to measure this effect would 
hold everything constant and only manipulate the treatment status. In other words, we would 
obtain the difference between potential outcomes by going back in time and changing the 
person’s treatment. Since this procedure is not possible, a range of studies have used 
randomized experiments as a good alternative to solve the selection problem. Even though 
randomized trials might be the best alternative to measure impacts, experimental data is not 
always easy available to researchers. As an alternative to randomization, methods using non-
experimental data have been developed to calculate impacts. For example, matching methods 
as propensity-score matching select on observable characteristics. Other methods as 
differences-in-differences estimators aim to control for unobservable characteristics.   
In order to calculate the impacts of a training program over a sample of individuals we need 
to: (1) identify the characteristics of the treatment or program, (2) identify the selection rule 
that assigned individuals to a control or treatment group and, (3) choose an estimator and 
econometric procedure to calculate the impacts of the program.  
Since the main characteristics of the training programs were explained in Section 2, we will 
explain the different selection rules used to assign individuals and the estimators used.  
The best evaluation method consists of randomizing sample members into a control or 
treatment group. In other words, randomization is the first-best of the selection rules because 
it provides experimental data. For example, experimental data allow us to calculate causal 
effects without the presence of selection bias. However, randomized data are not always easy 
available for researchers. For this reason, another option is to use non-experimental data. A 
comparison group obtained from non-experimental data tries to mimic the properties of the 
control group in a randomized experiment. 
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In the following subsections, we will explain these topics in more detail and follow closely 
the methodology used by Angrist and Pischke (2009), Blundell and Costa Dias (2009) and 
Wooldridge (2002). 
The question under analysis is whether earnings are affected by program participation. Let’s 
start by describing program participation by a binary random variable,  1,0iD , where 
1iD  indicates that individual i participates in the program and 0iD  indicates that 
individual i does not participate in the program. For any individual, there are two potential 
outcomes: 1iY  if 1iD  and 
0
iY  if 0iD . In other words, 
0
iY  represents the earnings of an 
individual who did not participate in the program, while 1iY  represents the earnings of the 
same individual had she participated in the program. The difference between 1iY  and 
0
iY  
would represent the causal effect of participating in the program for individual i. The 
observed outcome iY , can be written as a combination of potential outcomes: 
 
  .010 iiiii DYYYY   (3.1) 
This particular notation is useful because it contains the causal effect of program 
participation, i.e. 01 ii YY  . Since we never observe both potential outcomes for an individual, 
we estimate the effects of program enrollment by comparing the observed average earnings of 
participants versus observed average earnings of non-participants. This term is also known as 
the average treatment effect (ATE). Furthermore, we can express the ATE as the sum of the 
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) and the selection bias, 
 
       1|1|0|1| 01  iiiiiiii DYEDYEDYEDYE   
 
 
                                                 
   .0|1| 00  iiii DYEDYE  (3.2) 
 
Average Treatment Effect Average Treatment Effect on the Treated 
Selection Bias 
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The ATT reflects the average difference between the earnings of the participants and their 
earnings in case they did not participate. The selection bias represents the difference in 
average pre-treatment earnings between those who were and those who were not participants. 
As we can see, if we want to identify the difference between potential outcomes or ATT, we 
would not be able to find it directly in the data because of the presence of selection bias. One 
method to solve this problem is by random assignment. In this case, ATE is also equal to ATT 
given that randomization makes iD  independent of the potential outcomes. This topic will be 
explained in more detail in the first subsection. In case there is non-random selection, we find 
selection on the observables and selection on the unobservables. These two topics will be 
explained in the second and third subsections respectively. In addition, the selection process is 
expected to have larger consequences in the presence of heterogeneous effects. In the 
heterogeneous effect model, the treatment group members and the control group members 
might benefit differently from program participation, such that the ATT differs from the ATE. 
Thus, heterogeneity can be another reason (than selection bias) explaining why treatment 
effects might differ. However, in interpreting the estimates, we will disregard the presence of 
heterogeneity.  
3.1 Random Assignment 
Let’s suppose it is possible to run a social experiment where individuals are randomly 
assigned to a treatment group or a control group. If random assignment is correctly 
implemented, then we are able to rule out the bias arising from self-selection. In the case of 
the implementation of a welfare-to-work program, some individuals might be randomized into 
the training program, while the rest is excluded from the services provided by the program. 
Since assignment to treatment is random, then program participation would be independent of 
the outcome or the program effect.   
Explaining this more formally, random assignment to program participation solves the 
selection bias problem because randomization makes iD  independent of potential outcomes. 
To check this, note that the independence of 0iY  and iD means: 
   .0|1| 00  iiii DYEDYE  
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Simplifying equation (3.2) further to: 
 
       
   ,1|
0|1|0|1|
0101
01
iiiii
iiiiiiii
YYEDYYE
DYEDYEDYEDYE


 
 
(3.3) 
the effect of randomly assigned program participation on the participants is the same as the 
effect of program participation on a randomly chosen participant. In other words, the average 
treatment effect is equal to the average treatment effect on the treated when iD  is randomly 
assigned: 
    .1|0101 ATTDYYEYYEATE iiiii   
Causality can also be studied by using regression analysis. While controlling for covariates 
should not affect the consistency of the estimators under random assignment, it may help 
reduce noise and therefore make the estimators more precise. For example, let’s suppose 
constant treatment effects and express observed outcomes as a combination of potential 
outcomes as in equation 3.1. It is straightforward to see that equation (3.1) is equivalent to: 
 
      .00010 iiiiiii YEYDYYYEY   (3.4) 
Thus we can replace the terms in equation (3.4), obtaining: 
 
,iiii DY    (3.5) 
where 
 
 
 .
,
,
00
01
0
iii
iii
i
YEY
YY
YE






 
Equation (3.5) is a general model, since no functional form or assumptions have been 
imposed. In this fashion,  represents the expected untreated outcomes, i  reflects the 
difference between the potential outcomes or causal effect of the program, and i  represents 
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the random part of 0iY . If we evaluate the conditional expectation of this equation considering 
treatment status and control status, then we get: 
   
   .0|0|
,1|1|


iiii
iiiii
DEDYE
DEDYE


 
These equations imply that, 
 
       .0|1|0|1|  iiiiiiiii DEDEDYEDYE   (3.6) 
Thus the treatment effect is represented by i  and the second and third terms on the RHS of 
equation (3.6) account for the selection bias. As presented above, selection bias captures the 
correlation between the regression error term i  and the regressor iD . But since, 
       ,0|1|0|1| 00  iiiiiiii DYEDYEDEDE   
selection bias reflects the difference in (no participation) potential outcomes between those 
who participate in the program and those who do not. For example, in program evaluation, 
selection bias might arise when participation is voluntary given that volunteers might have 
intrinsically more difficulties finding a job than non-volunteers. Another example is selection 
bias arising from mandatory training programs, where individuals are non-randomly assigned 
to the treatment group based on certain criteria that makes them qualify as disadvantaged 
(lone mothers, ethnicity, education level, welfare recipients, etc.). 
If we implement random assignment in this type of model, we ensure that the treatment group 
members and the control group members are equal in all aspects except in the treatment 
status. In order to obtain randomization, two key assumptions must hold: 
 
     ,0|1| iiiii EDEDE    (A.1) 
 
     .0|1| iiiii EDEDE    (A.2) 
Assumption (A.1) is better known as no selection on untreated outcomes, where individuals’ 
untreated outcomes are not determined by their treatment status. Assumption (A.2) is better 
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known as no selection on the (expected) gains, in other words, expected gains do not 
determine participation.  
We can also express the terms in assumption (A.2) as: 
 
 
 
 .0|
,1|
,



ii
ATNT
ii
ATT
i
ATE
DE
DE
E


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Meaning that randomization eliminates the selection bias in (3.6) because of assumption (A.1) 
and randomization ensures that we identify the average treatment effect because of 
assumption (A.2).  In this fashion, when calculating the causal effects of training programs 
using OLS, the estimation of the parameter i reflects the average treatment effect ATE.  
Until now we have only talked about the first-best procedure of program evaluation, 
randomized trials. In the following subsection, non-random selection methods as selection on 
observables will be reviewed.   
3.2 Selection on observables 
As explained in the past section, the causal relationship between training programs and 
earnings tells us what individuals would earn on average if we could change their program 
participation in a completely controlled environment. If we want to generalize this notion to 
more complicated situations where control variables must be held fixed for causal inference to 
be valid, we have to state the conditional independence assumption (CIA). The conditional 
independence assumption is also called selection on observables because the covariates to be 
held fixed are assumed to be known and observed.  
As stated at the beginning of Section 3, we can write the estimator for the causal effects of 
program participation on earnings as: 
         .0|1|1|0|1| 0001  iiiiiiiiiii DYEDYEDYYEDYEDYE  
If participants are randomized into the treatment, then the selection bias is equal to zero, this 
means that the pre-treatment outcomes for participants and non-participants are equal. 
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However, if participants are not randomized into the training program, then selection bias can 
be positive or negative. For example, let’s consider a training program for female AFDC 
recipients where female recipients were randomized into the treatment. If we measure the 
causal effects of this program by comparing the participants’ earnings to male AFDC 
recipients’ earnings, then the selection bias might be negative. In other words, it could be 
expected that the pre-treatment earnings of male non-participants were larger than the pre-
treatment earnings of female participants. In this case, the ATE estimator would 
underestimate the benefits of the program. However, if we control for gender (observable 
characteristic) and compare the earnings of female participants to female non-participants, 
then the source of selection bias would disappear. This concept is considered in the 
conditional independence assumption or selection on observables. 
The CIA states that conditional on observed characteristics iX (gender, age, education, 
income), selection bias disappears. Stating this formally,  
 
 10 , ii YY   ┴  ,| ii XD  (3.7) 
which means that given the CIA, conditional-on- iX  comparisons of average earnings across 
program participation have a causal interpretation. In other words,  
 
     .|0,|1,| 01 iiiiiiiii XYYEDXYEDXYE   (3.8) 
Now, going back to the constant treatment effect assumption, we can calculate the causal 
relationship by using a regression like (3.5).
 
However, since equation (3.5) is a causal model, 
program participation iD  might be correlated with the error term i . Let’s suppose now that 
the CIA holds given a vector of observed characteristics, iX . Then decompose the random 
part of potential earnings i , into a linear function of observable covariates iX  and an error 
term, i : 
,iii X    
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where  is a regression coefficient that is assumed to satisfy   iii XXE  | . Given that   is 
defined by the regression of i  on iX , the residual i  and iX  are uncorrelated by 
construction. Therefore, the residual in the linear causal model 
 
iiiii XDY    (3.9) 
is uncorrelated with the regressors, iD  and iX , and the regressor i  is the causal effect. 
Emphasizing once again, the key assumption is that i  and iD  are correlated only through the 
observable characteristics iX . This is the well-known CIA or selection-on-observables 
assumption. 
Once we are clear about the linear causal model specification, there are many different 
econometric procedures that can be used in order to estimate the regressor i  or causal effect 
of the treatment. The simplest procedure is ordinary least squares, where the OLS estimator 
for i  is obtained by minimizing the sum of squared residuals (SSR). In other words, this 
method minimizes the sum of squared differences between the observed outcomes in the 
dataset and the outcomes predicted by the linear approximation.
11
  
Even though OLS is by far the most common procedure to control for selection on 
observables, it may be fragile to model misspecification. For this reason, we continue our 
analysis by using matching estimators. Since (non-parametric) matching estimators do not 
require a specific functional form of the outcome equation, there is in principle no bias arising 
from misspecification.  
In the following subsection, we will explain semi-parametric and non-parametric estimation 
based on the propensity-score. Propensity-score matching (PSM) can be applied over non-
experimental data and calculates the causal effects while controlling for observable 
characteristics. As mentioned, causal interpretation of regression coefficients and matching 
strategies are based on the conditional independence assumption. Indeed, matching and 
regression can both be considered as control strategies, where regression is a particular sort of 
weighted matching estimator. 
                                                 
11
 The implementation of ordinary least squares will be explained in detail in Section 5. 
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3.2.1 Semi-parametric and non-parametric estimation 
Matching and propensity-score matching 
Matching is an empirical tool where control participants are compared or matched to 
treatment participants based on similar observed characteristics. More specifically, matching 
controls for covariates based on the conditional independence assumption.
12
  
The matching estimators introduced by Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983) pair each treatment group 
member with a control group member. Thus, matching estimators are a weighted average of 
comparisons across individuals or groups, defined by covariates. In case treatment is 
independent of covariates, then the regression and matching weighting schemes would be 
equal. Another interesting fact is that neither matching estimators nor regression estimators 
give any weight to covariate cells that do not contain observations from both the control and 
treatment group. This condition is called common support
13
 and implies that estimators are 
limited to covariate values where both control and treated observations are found. 
In this subsection, we will build the propensity score matching estimators starting with the 
basic assumptions. First, we will explain in detail the common support condition. Second, we 
will present the propensity score theorem. Third, we will establish identification of the 
average treatment effects estimator by using inverse propensity score weighting. To finish, the 
propensity-score matching estimator will be presented. 
When evaluating the causal effects of training programs, the starting point is a comparison 
between the individual’s potential outcomes with treatment and without treatment. Because 
we cannot observe both states, given that the individual is a participant or not, then we can 
understand the problem as one of missing data. To approach this missing data problem, 
inverse probability weighting methods will be applied later on. 
The following approach assumes that we have an independent, identically distributed sample 
from the population. In other words, we are not considering cases where the treatment of one 
unit influences another unit’s outcome. This assumption is known as the stable unit treatment 
value assumption (SUTVA) and it states that the treatment of unit i affects only the outcome 
                                                 
12
 The conditional independence assumption is also known as ignorability, unconfoundedness or selection on 
observables.  
13
 The common support condition is also known as overlap assumption. 
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of unit i. In addition, we assume that the conditional independence assumption and common 
support condition hold.  
The common support assumption states that for any setting of the covariates in a certain 
population, there is a chance of seeing units in both the control and the treatment groups. 
Formally, for all iX , where   is the support of the covariates,  
 
  .1|10  ii XDP  (3.10) 
For example, if   0'|1  iii XXDP , then individuals having covariates 'iX  will never be 
in the treatment group. As a result, we will not be able to calculate the average treatment 
effects over the population that includes individuals with 'ii XX  . 
The probability of treatment, as a function of covariates iX , plays a central role in the 
estimation of the average treatment effects. This probably of treatment is usually known as 
the propensity score, and is defined as:  
 
     .|1| iiiii XDPXDEXp   (3.11) 
Given the common support assumption, the propensity score can never be equal to zero or 
one. As stated by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), if we add the CIA, we obtain the propensity 
score matching theorem: 
The Propensity Score Theorem 
Suppose the CIA holds such that   .|, 10 iiii XDYY   Then    .|, 10 iiii XpDYY   
In words, the propensity score theorem states that if potential outcomes are independent of 
treatment status conditional on a multivariate covariate vector iX , then potential outcomes 
are independent of treatment status conditional on a scalar function of covariates, the 
propensity score,  iXp .  
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Equivalent to what is stated by the OVB formula
14
, the propensity score theorem states that 
you need only control for covariates that affect the treatment status. More specifically, you 
only need to control for the covariate representing the probability of treatment.  
Now we have stated some basic assumptions required to estimate causal effects through 
matching methods. The next step is to identify the average treatment effect estimator by using 
inverse probability weighting.  
Inverse probability weighting is a general approach to non-random sampling applied in the 
presence of missing data. Briefly explained, it solves the missing data problem when selection 
probabilities are observed. Stating this more formally, the population mean of any function of 
the treatment iD can be recovered by weighting the selected observation by the inverse of the 
probability of selection (propensity score). 
Let’s start by defining two counterfactual conditional means, 
 
   ,|00 iii XYEX           .|
1
1 iii XYEX   (3.12) 
In this fashion, we note that the average treatment effect conditional on iX  can be expressed 
as: 
 
       .| 0101 iiiiii XXXYYEX    (3.13) 
If we want to establish identification of  iX , we can do this by calculating both 
counterfactual conditional means in the RHS of equation (3.13). Inverse propensity score 
weighting allows to calculate the values of 0  and 1 , given the propensity score theorem. 
According to Imbens (2000), the propensity score theorem implies that instead of having to 
adjust for all pre-treatment variables, it is sufficient to adjust for the propensity score  iXp  . 
Noting that 1iiii YDYD   and assuming that CIA holds, by iterated expectations,  
                                                 
14
 One important finding in regression theory is the omitted variables bias formula, which states that coefficients 
on included variables are unaffected by the omission of variables, when the variables omitted are uncorrelated 
with the variables included. This concept was extended by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) in their propensity 
score theorem, where estimation strategies relying on matching use a dummy as the causal variable of interest. 
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Combining these two results, we obtain 
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 (3.14) 
According Abadie and Imbens (2002), if we average the conditional treatment effect over the 
marginal distribution of iX , we obtain the average treatment effect estimator: 
 
  .i
ATE XE  
 (3.15) 
Along these lines, identification of ATE  is established by using the propensity score. Since 
iD , iY  and iX  are all observed, it is straightforward to calculate the causal effects. In 
practice, however, we need to first calculate the propensity score function  p . Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1983) suggest using a flexible logit model to calculate the propensity score, where 
various interactions of the covariates iX are included. For the moment, let  iXpˆ  denote the 
estimator of the propensity score, using a logit model. Then, following equation (3.15), we 
obtain 
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 (3.16) 
This estimator is consistent under the conditional independence assumption and the common 
support assumption.  
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In the next subsection, econometric methods that control for unobservable characteristics will 
be explained.  
3.3 Selection on unobservables 
In randomized experiments, since the assignment to treatment is independent of outcomes, 
then causal effects can be measured straightforward and no selection bias is found. Assuming 
that the CIA holds and conditioning on observables, we can still calculate causal effects given 
that no selection bias is found. However, if we explicitly allow selection to be correlated with 
unobservables after conditioning on exogenous variables, then we need to use selection-on-
unobservables methods. In other words, the CIA fails to hold when individual unobserved 
characteristics that determine participation, affect the outcome. To address this, we may apply 
methods developed to control for these unobserved characteristics as time trends, state-
specific or individual-specific characteristics, etc. 
In the following subsection the differences-in-differences estimator will be explained in 
detail. Nevertheless, this is not the only econometric procedure that controls for 
unobservables. There are other popular procedures that control for selection on 
unobservables: e.g. instrumental variables and fixed effects models. However, these will not 
be employed in the empirical analysis, and are therefore not discussed here.  
3.3.1 Differences-in-Differences (DD) 
When calculating the differences-in-differences estimator, we control for biases that could 
arise from the comparison between the two groups. As mentioned by Imbens and Wooldridge 
(2009): “This double differencing removes biases in second period comparisons between the 
treatment and control group that could be the result from permanent differences between those 
groups, as well as biases from comparisons over time in the treatment group that could be the 
result of time trends unrelated to the treatment”. 
DD is a version of fixed effects estimation that uses aggregated data by comparing the before 
and after across groups. The main idea is to use a naturally occurring event to create a shift in 
the treatment for one group and not another. Thus the difference between these two groups 
before and after the treatment is compared, creating the DD estimator of the training program.   
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Normally, DD explores a change in policy occurring at a specific period, which translates in 
part of the population receiving treatment. Thus longitudinal data are used, where the same 
individuals are followed over time, before and after the implementation of the program. Since 
a time dimension is added to the problem, time must be explicitly introduced in the model 
specification. Each sample member is observed before and after the program implementation, 
at times 0t  and 1t , respectively. In this context, itD  denotes the treatment status of 
group member i at time t and iD (without the time subscript) denotes the treatment group to 
which individual i belongs. It is straightforward to notice that 1iD  for treatment group 
members and 1itD  for treatment group members after program implementation. 
Since the DD estimator uses a common trend assumption and assumes no selection on the 
transitory shock, we can write the outcome equation as: 
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 (3.17) 
In equation (3.17), in  is an unobservable individual fixed effect and tm  is an aggregate macro 
shock. Thus, the DD estimator is based on assumption (A.1) holding in first differences 
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Equation (3.17) does not exclude the possibility of selection on unobservables, but it restricts 
its source by ruling out selection based on transitory individual-specific effects. In other 
words, any possible unobservable individual effects are supposed to be time invariant. In 
addition, it does not rule out selection on expected gains, i.e. assumption (A.2) does not hold. 
In this fashion, differences-in-differences estimators only identify the ATT. We will come 
back to this topic later on.  
Following equation (3.17), we can write: 
 
      ,1|1|,| tiiiiiit mDnEDEtDYE     
if 1iD  and 1t . Otherwise, 
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It is straightforward to calculate the DD estimator, by eliminating both  and the error 
components through sequential differences 
 
 
    
    .0,0|1,0|
0,1|1,1|
1|



tDYEtDYE
tDYEtDYE
DE
iitiit
iitiit
ATT
ii
ATT


 
(3.18) 
The DD estimator is obtained by subtracting the gain over time in the control group from the 
gain over time in the treatment group. Double differencing is used to remove the bias 
associated with a common time trend unrelated to the implementation of the program. In other 
words, the average difference over time in the control group ( 0iD ) is subtracted from the 
average difference over time in the treatment group ( 1iD ). 
If we calculate the sample analog of equation (3.18), we obtain the DD estimator: 
 
   ,00011011   ttttDID YYYY  (3.19) 
where iDtY  is the average outcome over group iD  at time t. DD measures the excess outcome 
change for the treatment group members as compared to the control group members, 
identifying the average treatment effect on the treated, 
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Section 4 describes the data and explains some of the main characteristics of the sample. In 
addition, it checks balance between control group and treatment group members.   
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4 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
This study uses National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies (NEWWS) data, which 
provide wide information for U.S. citizens. The Department of Health and Human Services is 
the responsible for providing the information for seven locales: Atlanta, Georgia; Columbus, 
Ohio; Detroit and Grand Rapids, Michigan; Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Portland, Oregon; 
and Riverside, California. These sites were nominated by their states and chosen based on 
four different criteria: (1) prior experience running welfare-to-work programs; (2) an interest 
in human capital activities; (3) large enough caseloads to provide the sample needed for the 
experiments; and (4) the commitment to run a random assignment study (Hamilton & Brock, 
1994).  
There are six main datasets available as part of NEWWS data, however our study focuses on 
the five-year full impact sample considering three sites: Grand Rapids, Portland and 
Riverside. 
As a general overview, the sample used contains background characteristics as: year of 
randomization, gender, marital status, number of children, ethnicity, age and education level. 
Administrative records for each observation are also considered, including 2 years of data 
prior randomization and 5 years of data after random assignment. Some of the variables 
included in the administrative records are: earnings, employment status, welfare payments 
and food stamp payments. Earnings were converted to 1996 dollars using the consumer price 
index CPI-U (Economic Report of the President, 2000). 
Our analysis includes all data for women in Grand Rapids, Portland and Riverside; which had 
two years of earnings data prior to random assignment. In Riverside, sample members were 
randomized into control and treatment groups between the second quarter of 1991 and the 
second quarter of 1993. In Grand Rapids, randomization took place between the third quarter 
of 1991 and the first quarter of 1994. In Portland, random assignment started in the first 
quarter of 1993 and ended in the fourth quarter of 1994 (Michalopoulos et al., 2004).  
Comparisons using experimental data: Control and treatment group members were assigned 
randomly right after the JOBS orientation, in the case of experimental data. As mentioned 
earlier, individuals in Portland were randomized into a control or treatment group, where 
treatment group members participated mainly in employment-focused activities. Individuals 
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in Grand Rapids were randomly assigned to a control, LFA or HCD group. In Riverside, after 
obtaining the results from the CASAS exams, individuals with low scores went through a 
three-way random assignment as in Grand Rapids, while individuals with high scores were 
assigned to a control or LFA group.  
It is of importance to check if random assignment of individuals was successful, i.e., if 
randomized groups are balanced, with similar pre-treatment characteristics. To do this, we can 
compare the average pre-treatment values of control and outcome variables among the 
randomized groups. 
Table 1 shows that in Portland, most of the differences between control group and treatment 
group members are not significantly different from zero. However, there were some 
exceptions as food stamp payments, number of children and education. Control group 
members tended to receive higher amount of food stamp payments and more frequently than 
treatment group members. A higher percentage of program participants had only one child, 
while a higher share of control group members had three or more children. The treatment 
group had a higher share of individuals having a high school diploma or GED certificates. 
Furthermore, when comparing sample sizes, almost as twice as many participants were 
assigned to the treatment group.  
The balancing analysis for the other two sites, Grand Rapids and Riverside, tells the same 
story. For this reason, these results will only be explained briefly.   
Balance was reached for almost all the characteristics in Grand Rapids. Nevertheless, there 
were some exceptions, where differences were significantly different from zero. For example, 
control group members received larger AFDC monthly payments than individuals in both 
treatment groups. A slightly lower percentage of HCD participants had Afro-American 
ethnicity, when compared to their counterfactuals.
15
 
In the case of Riverside, there were no differences significantly different from zero, when 
comparing groups formed by individuals needing education.
16
 For individuals that were not in 
need of education, control group members earned $400 extra on average than their 
                                                 
15
 For more details, see Appendix Table B.1. 
16
 For more details, see Appendix Table B.2. 
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counterfactuals, during the pre-randomization period. In addition, a higher percentage of 
treatment group members received AFDC payments the year prior to random assignment.
17
 
Comparisons using non-experimental data: When applying non-experimental methods, a 
control group from one site (control group) is compared to a control group from another site 
(comparison group). As before, balance will be checked by comparing earnings, employment 
and demographic characteristics among sites.  
The top panel of table 2 summarizes earnings and employment characteristics for control 
group individuals in the three sites. Differences in average annual earnings and average 
quarters employed in two years prior to random assignment were significantly different from 
zero for the three comparisons. The largest difference in average earnings prior randomization 
was $865, between Riverside and Portland. On average, individuals in Portland were 
employed one quarter a year, while individuals in Grand Rapids were employed 1,28 quarters 
a year. Considering years 1 and 2 after randomization, control group members belonging to 
Portland had significantly higher annual earnings ($2672) than individuals in Riverside 
($2370). This trend continued through the third to the fifth years, where individuals in Grand 
Rapids and Portland had average earnings of $5497 and $5264, while individuals in Riverside 
earned $3875 per year. 
The bottom panel of table 2 summarizes the demographic characteristics for control group 
members that will be used as covariates when calculating regressions. The caseload in Grand 
Rapids seems to be slightly younger than in Riverside, this might explain the higher share of 
individuals with one child. Portland has the highest share of white individuals (70%), while 
Grand Rapids has the higher share of individuals with Afro-American background (41%) and 
Riverside has the higher share of Hispanics (28%). It might be of interest to notice that the 
share of Hispanics in Grand Rapids and Portland was set to zero in order to protect the 
identity of the individuals. In these two sites, individuals with Latin-American background are 
considered part of the group “not black or white”. Some other differences are observed when 
reporting marital status and age of the youngest child, however differences between sites 
might naturally arise given the sample sizes. 
Section 5 reviews the implementation of the different econometric methods. 
                                                 
17
 For more details, see Appendix Table B.3.  
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Table 1.- Selected characteristics of female sample members with two years of earnings data prior to random 
assignment, Portland. 
Characteristic Control Program Difference
Earnings, welfare payments and employment
Employed in year prior randomization 0,3981 0,4139 0,0159
(0,4896) (0,4926) (0,0143)
Earnings in year prior randomization 1349,3240 1429,7810 80,4574
(2969,7500) (3065,0610) (88,3012)
Received AFDC during year prior randomization 0,8502 0,8488 -0,0014
(0,3570) (0,3583) (0,0104)
Monthly AFDC received in year prior to RA 375,1936 369,8660 -5,3276
(189,7974) (188,1109) (5,4984)
Number of months received AFDC year prior RA 8,1898 8,0139 -0,1760
(4,7209) (4,7391) (0,1379)
Received Food Stamps in year prior RA 0,8962 0,8737 -0,0224**
(0,3051) (0,3322) (0,0094)
Monthly Food Stamps received 219,5522 211,0973 -8,4549***
(102,3303) (106,5724) (3,0607)
9,1898 8,8254 -0,3645***
(4,3051) (4,5025) (0,1291)
Demographic Characteristics
Single parent, ever married 0,5044 0,5141 0,0097
(0,5001) (0,4999) (0,0146)
One child 0,3699 0,4025 0,0326**
(0,4829) (0,4905) (0,0143)
Two children 0,3328 0,3363 0,0035
(0,4713) (0,4725) (0,0138)
Three or more children 0,2973 0,2612 -0,0361***
(0,4572) (0,4394) (0,0130)
Any child 0-5 years old 0,7043 0,6980 -0,0063
(0,4565) (0,4592) (0,0134)
Black 0,1974 0,1977 0,0003
(0,3981) (0,3983) (0,0116)
Not black or white 0,1028 0,1072 0,0044
(0,3037) (0,3094) (0,0090)
Age at random assignment 30,7491 30,5128 -0,2363
(6,4545) (6,5420) (0,1897)
High school diploma or GED 0,6339 0,6668 0,0328**
(0,4819) (0,4714) (0,0139)
Sample size 1849 3247
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
All dollar amounts are in 1996 dollars.
Number of months receiving Food Stamps prior 
random assignment
Portland
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Table 2.- Selected characteristics of female control group members with two years of earnings data prior to 
random assignment by site. 
Characteristic Riverside Grand Rapids Portland Port-Grand River-Grand River-Port
Earnings and Employment
2683,80 2134,67 1819,05 -315,62** 549,13*** 864,75***
(5049,72) (4041,11) (3492,95) (132,70) (154,48) (133,84)
1,08 1,28 1,00 -0,28*** -0,21*** 0,07*
(2,68) (2,59) (2,48) (0,09) (0,09) (0,08)
2369,61 2518,55 2672,16 153,61 -148,94 -302,55**
(5030,60) (4311,95) (4402,61) (154,92) (156,49) (142,25)
3874,76 5497,09 5264,28 -232,82-1622,33*** -1389,52***
(6794,84) (6720,90) (6657,16) (237,30) (220,17) (199,86)
Demographic Characteristics
Age (years) 32,11 29,65 30,75 1,09 2,45 1,36
Ethnicity 
White 0,51 0,48 0,70 0,22 0,03 -0,19
Black 0,17 0,41 0,20 -0,21 -0,24 -0,03
Hispanic 0,28 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,28 0,28
Not black or white 0,32 0,11 0,10 -0,01 0,21 0,22
Received high school diploma or GED 0,64 0,59 0,63 0,04 0,04 0,01
Single parent, ever married 0,66 0,42 0,50 0,08 0,24 0,16
Number of children
One child 0,38 0,46 0,37 -0,09 -0,07 0,02
Two children 0,32 0,36 0,33 -0,03 -0,04 -0,01
Three or more children 0,28 0,19 0,29 0,11 0,10 -0,01
Any child 0-5 years old 0,57 0,69 0,70 0,01 -0,12 -0,12
Sample size 2960 1390 1849
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
All dollar amounts are in 1996 dollars.
Average annual earnings in two years 
prior to random assignment (1996 $)
Average annual quarters employed in 
two years prior to random assignment
Average annual earnings in years 1 
and 2 after random assignment (1996 $)
Average annual earnings in years 3, 4, 
and 5 after random assignment (1996 $)
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5 Implementation 
In this section, the implementation of different econometric methods using experimental and 
non-experimental data will be explained.  
Referencing Section 3, experimental data are obtained by randomizing individuals into a 
control or treatment group, i.e., program participation is independent from the outcomes. 
Non-experimental data reflect the presence of a selection rule, e.g., selection on observable 
characteristics or selection on unobservable characteristics. Methods as OLS and PSM rule 
out selection by controlling for observable characteristics, obtaining unbiased estimators of 
causal effects. Differences-in-differences rules out selection on unobservables by restricting 
its source and removing the common trend bias by double-differencing.    
When considering the impact of programs over randomized data, we simply compare the 
outcome variables for control group members to treatment group members. This procedure is 
straightforward for Portland and Grand Rapids, since there is only one control group. In 
Riverside, there are 2 control groups and 3 treatment groups in total, so the impacts must be 
measured using the right comparison.  
In the case of non-experimental comparisons, we use control group members from different 
sites. For example, the control group members in Portland are compared to the control group 
members in Grand Rapids. This allows calculating the selection bias arising from non-
experimental methods as propensity-score matching. 
In the following subsections, we will explain in detail the implementation of these procedures. 
5.1 Random assignment 
As mentioned, since individuals in our sample have been randomized into a control and 
treatment group, causal effects can be measured directly by calculating the difference in mean 
outcomes between control and treatment group members. Strictly speaking, in the presence of 
random assignment, the average treatment effect is equal to the average treatment effect on 
the treated, given that selection bias is equal zero. However, randomized experiments do not 
always lead to balanced subjects’ characteristics across the control and treatment groups. 
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Thus it is important to check first whether or not randomization was successful. Following 
this guideline, Section 4 showed that differences across control and treatment groups were 
small and not significantly different from zero. As a result, we can assume that random 
assignment worked as expected and proceed to estimate the causal effects of program 
participation.   
In Portland, treatment group members were compared to control group members. In Grand 
Rapids, there were two comparisons: (1) LFA group members were compared to control 
group members, and (2) HCD group members were compared to control group members. In 
Riverside, causal effects for individuals in need and not in need of education were calculated 
separately. For individuals in need of education, there were two comparisons: (1) LFA 
participants were compared to control group members, and (2) HCD participants were 
compared to control group members. For individuals that were not in need of education, there 
was only one comparison: LFA participants were compared to control group members.   
The following regression including control and treatment group members for each site is 
estimated through OLS: 
 
,iii PY    (5.1) 
where 
 iY = earnings after random assignment for sample member i, 
 1iP  if the sample member is in the treatment group and 0 if she is in the control  
group. 
Since randomly assigned program participants are compared to randomly assigned control 
group members, the difference in average outcomes between the two groups should reflect the 
average treatment effect of program participation. Thus, the parameter   in the equation (5.1) 
provides an estimate of causal effects of program participation. In case the estimated 
coefficient  is equal to zero, this would imply that there is no difference in outcomes arising 
from program participation. In other words, it would mean that the training program did not 
have any effects on the earnings of its participants.  
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5.2 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
In this subsection, ordinary least squares regressions are calculated using non-experimental 
data. Control group members from one site, were compared to control group members from 
another site. For example, control group members from Portland were part of the “control 
group”, while control group members from Grand Rapids were part of the “comparison 
group”. Following this procedure, we obtain three different comparisons: Portland – Grand 
Rapids, Riverside – Grand Rapids and Riverside – Portland. 
The following regression including the full sample (control and comparison group members) 
is estimated through OLS: 
 
    j j m iimmijjijjii XWZCY ,  (5.2) 
where 
 iY = earnings after random assignment for sample member i, 
 1iC  if the sample member is in the control group and 0 if she is in the comparison  
group, 
ijZ  earnings in the j-th quarter prior to random assignment for sample member i,  
1ijW if the sample member was employed in the j-th quarter before random  
assignment, and 0 otherwise, 
imX  the m-th background characteristic for sample member i.  
Since control group members are compared to a non-experimentally chosen control group, 
there is no average treatment effect on the treated because no individuals are treated. Thus, the 
parameter   in the equation above provides an estimate of the mean selection bias for the full 
sample. In case the estimated coefficient  is equal to zero, this would imply that there is no 
selection bias arising from non-experimental comparisons. Thus the model (5.2) would be 
successful when controlling for observables. 
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5.3 Propensity score matching (PSM) 
In our study, we use propensity score sub-classification methods to estimate the bias resulting 
from non-experimental mismatch. Since control group members from one site are compared 
to control group members from another site, no individuals are being treated. This implies that 
the observed difference in average earnings would represent the selection bias arising from 
empirical mismatch.  
We will calculate the out-of-state bias using the sub-classification approach of propensity-
score matching. There were two biases calculated for each comparison: short-run bias 
covering the two years following random assignment and medium-run bias covering the third 
through fifth years following random assignment. These two biases are assessed in order to 
check if non-experimental methods perform better in the near future. This might be of 
relevance for policy makers because while the impacts of some policies might be evaluated on 
short-run basis, other programs (like Human Capital Development approach) might be best 
evaluated on longer-term effects. 
In the following, we will use the approach stated by Michalopoulos et al. (2004). The sub-
classification approach of propensity-score matching method groups all sample members into 
subclasses with similar propensity scores. We obtain an estimate of the bias for each subclass 
from the difference between control group and comparison group outcomes. To estimate the 
bias for the full sample, we calculate a program participation regression, where dummies for 
all subclasses except one are included.   
First, we estimate a logistic regression of the factors predicting membership in the control 
group from the full sample. The estimators obtained were then used to obtain a propensity 
score for each sample member, based on her individual characteristics. 
Second, we create subclasses of sample members based on similar propensity scores. This 
step created five subclasses based on the quintile distribution of estimated control group 
propensity scores. As a model specification test, comparison group members whose 
propensity scores were outside the range were eliminated. All control group members 
remained in the analysis. The rest of the sample members were placed in their respective 
subclass. 
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Third, we run a specification test to check if the background characteristics of control and 
comparison group members are balanced (matched) in each subclass: 
 
,   j m iimmijjijj ji XWZC   (5.3) 
 where 
 1iC  if the sample member is in the control group and 0 if she is in the comparison  
group, 
ijZ  earnings in the j-th quarter prior to random assignment for sample member i,  
1ijW  if the sample member was employed in the j-th quarter before random  
assignment, and 0 otherwise, 
imX  the m-th background characteristic for sample member i.  
As we can see, equation (5.3) is analogous to equation (5.2) used when calculating the OLS 
estimator. 
The next step was to conduct an F-test of the joint null hypothesis that all estimated 
parameters for the equation above are zero except for the intercept. The null hypothesis would 
then imply that the mean values for all variables in the model are the same (balanced) for both 
control and comparison groups. 
If a subclass was not balanced (the parameters in the model were jointly significantly different 
from zero at the ten percent level), then it was split in two and tested for balance again. 
Unbalanced classes were divided until (1) all subclasses were balanced, or (2) further 
subdividing would result in a subclass with fewer than ten control or comparison group 
members. 
In our study, considering the three particular sites used, we did not have any problems 
reaching balance. But as mentioned by Michalopoulos et al (2004), in case subclasses 
remained unbalanced, the process was started again by re-estimating the logistic regression on 
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the full sample after adding higher order terms, interactions or both. Large t-statistics on 
coefficient estimates for the unbalanced subclasses were considered when choosing which 
terms to add. After estimating the new logistic regression, the whole process was repeated 
over and over again until balance was achieved. If balance could not be achieved, then there 
was no calculated bias from that comparison. 
When balance was achieved, the selection bias for subclass k was estimated following: 
 
,    j j m iimmkijjkijjkikki XWZCY   (5.4) 
where iY  represents earnings after random assignment for individual i. Even though 
individuals from the same subclass should have similar values of covariates, the regression 
adjusts for any small differences that could still exist between the two groups. The parameter 
k  in the equation above estimates the bias in subclass k. We need to assume that i  is mean 
independent of each variable included on the RHS of equation (5.4), in order to obtain a 
consistent estimate of k . This means that there are no unobserved factors that affect the 
follow-up earnings iY , earnings before randomization ijZ  and employment levels ijW . The 
term imX  includes all the covariates used in the initial logistic regression plus an age-squared 
term. 
As final step, the mean bias for the full sample is estimated by running the following 
regression: 
 
,
1
i
K
k ikkii
SCY   

 (5.5) 
where 
iY = earnings after random assignment for sample member i, 
 1iC  if the sample member is in the control group and 0 if she is in the comparison  
group, 
 1ikS if individual i is member of subclass k and 0 otherwise. 
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The parameter   in the equation (5.5) estimates the average bias for the comparison between 
the two sites.  
5.4 Differences-in-Differences (DD) 
Differences-in-differences is one of the econometric procedures that controls for unobservable 
characteristics when using non-experimental data. In our study, regression analysis is used to 
estimate the causal effects through double differencing by comparing control group members 
from one site to control group members from another site. As in subsection 5.2, control group 
members from Portland were part of the “control group”, while control group from Grand 
Rapids were part of the “comparison group”. Following this procedure, we obtain three 
different out-of-state comparisons: Portland – Grand Rapids, Riverside – Grand Rapids and 
Riverside – Portland. 
In order to obtain the causal effects through double differencing, we can calculate the 
following the regression: 
 
  ,igtm immj ijjitigitigigt XWDDDDY     (5.6) 
 where 
igtY = earnings for sample member i, member of group g, in period t, 
1igD  if the individual i belongs to the control group, and 0 if she belongs to the 
 comparison group, 
1itD  if the observations for individual i were obtained after program  
 implementation, and 0 otherwise, 
Equation (5.6) includes a group effect represented by  , a time effect represented by  and an 
interaction term   representing the causal effect of the training program. As explained in 
subsection (3.3.1), by double differencing we obtain the causal effect parameter  . 
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6 Results 
There are three key empirical conclusions from this study. First, results obtained using non-
experimental data can lead to wrong conclusions about the causal effects of a training 
program. Second, biases obtained from non-experimental data depend not only on the 
econometric procedure used but also on the chosen comparison group. Third, comparisons 
longer ahead in time are more susceptible to selection bias problems. In other words, medium-
run bias was larger than short-run bias. 
6.1 Experimental results 
Table 3 presents the impacts of welfare-to-work programs in the three sites of interest. As 
mentioned earlier, since the conditional independence assumption holds when randomized 
data is used, impacts can be measured by calculating the difference of means between 
treatment and control group members. In other words, an unbiased estimator of the causal 
effect of the program on earnings can be obtained through difference of means given random 
assignment.  
Impacts obtained in the short run were normally higher than those obtained in the medium run 
and were also significantly different from zero (table 3). In Portland, results in the short run 
were slightly higher than in the medium run on average. Figure 1 reflects that in pre-
randomization quarters, treatment group members’ earnings were followed closely by the 
earnings of control group members. However, program implementation increased 
significantly quarterly earnings of treated individuals, just to be caught again by control 
individuals in the last year of the evaluation.  
In Grand Rapids, LFA program participants got slightly higher earnings than HCD 
participants in the short run (table 3). However, medium run differences were not 
significantly different from zero for none of the programs. In other words, differences 
between program and control group members tended to dissipate in the last year of the 
evaluation (figure 2). 
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Table 3.- Results obtained using experimental data. Impacts are measured through the difference of means 
between the randomized treatment group and the randomized control group. 
(1) (2)
Control and treatment groups Short Run Medium Run
Portland 1190,88*** 1055,63***
(144,98) (213,81)
Grand Rapids LFA 466,63*** 80,65
(158,31) (253,58)
HCD 431,41** 228,10
(178,22) (264,91)
Riverside
In need of education LFA 758,37*** 453,85**
(156,06) (200,34)
HCD 323,92** 317,03
(146,81) (195,31)
Not in need of education LFA 863,51*** 230,82
(212,90) (283,76)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
All dollar amounts are in 1996 dollars.
Difference of Means
Experimental Data
Note: Short run is defined as the two years following random assignment and medium 
run is defined as the third through fifth years following random assignment.
 
 
In Riverside, participants were divided in two groups, depending on the scores obtained in the 
CASAS exams. For both groups, LFA program showed to be more effective than HCD 
program when increasing earnings of its participants (table 3). As expected, earnings of 
individuals not in need of education were always higher than their counterfactuals needing 
education (figure 3). 
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Figure 1.- Mean quarterly earnings: Portland 
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Figure 2.- Mean quarterly earnings: Grand Rapids 
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Figure 3.- Mean quarterly earnings: Riverside 
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6.2 Non-experimental results 
Results obtained from randomized data are commonly considered a benchmark when 
comparing results obtained using empirical methods. As explained in Section 3, if we assume 
that we can control on observable characteristics and the CIA holds, then we can obtain 
unbiased estimators of causal effects even though participants were not randomly assigned 
into the control and treatment groups. Another option is to assume the presence of 
unobservable characteristics and therefore apply methods that calculate the impacts by 
eliminating the fixed effects.  
In this subsection, we estimate the impacts of the program on each site when using non-
experimental data. In order to do this, we consider the results obtained from experimental data 
and the estimated biases obtained from non-experimental data.
18
 Causal effects using 
experimental data were calculated through the difference between mean earnings of a 
randomized treatment group and mean earnings of a randomized control group. Estimated 
biases using non-experimental data arose from the comparison in outcomes between a 
randomized control group and an experimentally chosen comparison group. Thus we can 
calculate the impacts of the program when using non-experimental data by adding 
experimental results and non-experimental biases. This would be the equivalent to comparing 
the outcomes of a randomized treatment group to a non-randomly chosen comparison group.  
                                                 
18
 For more details on the estimated biases using non-experimental data, see subsection 6.3. 
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The first row of table 4 reflects the experimental results obtained for Portland. Causal effects 
using experimental data were only calculated using one method: difference of means. 
However, causal effects should not vary significantly when calculated using other methods, 
given that data are randomized. In other words, in an experimental evaluation, estimates of 
the program effect should not depend on the way earnings and participation equations are 
specified (LaLonde, 1986). As LaLonde (1986) mentions in his seminal paper: “If the 
econometric model is specified correctly, the non-experimental estimates should be the same 
(within sampling error) as the training effect generated from the experimental data, but if 
there is a significant difference between the non-experimental and the experimental estimates, 
the econometric model is misspecified”. For this reason, it is of interest to compare 
experimental and non-experimental estimates.  
Table 4 presents estimates for three comparisons in Portland. The first row compares a 
randomized treatment group to a randomized control group, where both groups are from 
Portland. The second (third) row compares a randomized treatment group from Portland to an 
experimentally chosen control group from Riverside (Grand Rapids). Results from the 
comparison between Portland and Grand Rapids are the closest to experimentally obtained 
results. However, we can observe that as a general overview, short run and medium run 
impacts vary widely depending on the comparison site and econometric procedure chosen. 
Short run impacts vary from $1348 to $2327, while medium run impacts vary from $772 to 
$3278. Non-experimental estimations can lead us to results that are as large as three times the 
experimental results.  
The non-experimental results for the other two sites, Grand Rapids and Riverside, tell a 
similar story. For this reason, the results will only be explained briefly.   
In Grand Rapids, the labor force attachment program had impacts ranging from $16 and up to 
$1152 in the short run, and from $24 to $2247 in the medium run. Human capital 
development program’s effects ranged from -$19 and up to $1117 in the short run, and from 
$172 to $2394 in the medium run.
19
  
In Riverside, there were two main trends arising from non-experimental comparisons. First, in 
the short run, labor force attachment programs had larger impacts than human capital 
development programs. Second, most of the non-experimental comparisons showed that both 
                                                 
19
 For more details, see Appendix Table C.1. 
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Table 4.- Comparison between short-run and medium-run impacts measured using experimental and non-experimental data: Portland 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatment and control group Short Run Medium Run Short Run Medium Run Short Run Medium Run Short Run Medium Run
Portland (control) 1190,88*** 1055,63***
Portland (Riverside) 1455,16 2397,68 1777,35 2718,51 1686,22 2588,12 2327,32 3278,15
Portland (Grand Rapids) 1348,39 851,09 1423,88 772,18 1419,52 808,65 1641,54 1111,88
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: Short run is defined as the two years following random assignment and medium run is defined as the third through fifth years following random assignment
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
All dollar amounts are in 1996 dollars.
Differences-in-differences
Selection on observables
OLS Regression
Propensity-score 
subclassificationDifference of Means
Selection on unobservables
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 programs had negative impacts in the medium run. These results might arise from the fact 
that bias tended to be larger when further away in time. In other words, larger biases were 
found when comparing control groups from different sites in the medium run. Strictly 
speaking, the LFA program had impacts ranging from $73 and up to $615 in the short run, 
and from -$888 to -$1769 in the medium run, for individuals in need of education. HCD 
program had impacts from -$813 to $180 in the short run, and from -$1025 to -$1905 in the 
medium run. LFA program for individuals not in need of education had impacts from -$273 to 
$720 in the short run, and from -$1111 to -$1992 in the medium run.
20
 
6.3 Estimated bias arising from non-
experimental data 
In this subsection, short-run and medium-run biases arising from different econometric 
specifications are calculated by controlling for observable and unobservable characteristics. 
The calculations from this section were used to obtain the non-experimental results explained 
in subsection 6.2. 
Let’s first check the evolution of mean quarterly earnings for control group members in Grand 
Rapids, Portland and Riverside. Figure 4 reflects that Riverside had the highest earnings of 
the three sites before random assignment. However, after the randomization, earnings were 
higher for control group members in Grand Rapids and Portland. As shown in the figure, 
earnings of individuals in Grand Rapids were closely followed by the earnings of individuals 
in Portland for the whole period. This could suggest that a lower bias would arise from the 
comparison between Grand Rapids and Portland, than the bias arising from the comparison 
between any other sites. 
Table 5 presents the estimated short-run and medium-run bias from different econometric 
specifications. As a general conclusion, for all sites except one, medium-run bias was larger 
than short-run bias. In other words, comparisons longer ahead in time were more susceptible 
to selection bias problems. It can also be observed that for almost all methods, biases 
calculated between Portland and Grand Rapids were small and not significantly different from 
zero. This conclusion fits the prediction obtained from the analysis of figure 4. 
                                                 
20
 For more details, see Appendix Table C.2. 
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When comparing Riverside to Portland, all biases calculated were significantly different from 
zero and varied between -$264 and -$2223. Furthermore, calculated biases were smaller when 
using methods that select on observables. The two methods that minimized short-run and 
medium-run biases were difference of means and propensity-score subclassification.  
The comparison between Riverside and Grand Rapids originated biases starting at -$143 and 
up to -$2166. Again, methods that select on observable characteristics showed to originate 
lower biases. Furthermore, differences in means and propensity-score subclassification 
showed to be best econometric procedures.  
Biases arising from the comparison between Portland and Grand Rapids were small and not 
significantly different from zero as a general rule. While methods selecting on observables 
predicted negative medium-run biases, differences-in-differences predicted a positive bias. 
However, this result is not especially important given that the biases are not significantly 
different from zero. 
The implications of these results together with the concluding remarks will be discussed in the 
next section. 
 
Figure 4.- Mean quarterly earnings of control group members in Grand Rapids, Portland and Riverside. 
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Table 5.- Estimated short-run and medium-run bias for comparisons between control group members in Grand Rapids, Portland and Riverside 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Short Run Medium Run Short Run Medium Run Short Run Medium Run Short Run Medium Run
Portland -264,28* -1342,05*** -586,47*** -1662,88*** -495,34*** -1532,49*** -1136,44*** -2222,52***
(143,42) (201,17) (129,90) (191,23) (146,53) (206,03) (163,35) (211,54)
Grand Rapids -143,44 -1626,52*** -473,19*** -2005,65*** -281,07 -1779,18*** -685,77*** -2166,28***
(158,09) (222,27) (146,87) (218,42) (171,44) (240,82) (184,13) (233,89)
Grand Rapids 157,51 -240,54 233,00 -283,45 228,64 -246,98 450,66* 56,25
(151,07) (235,05) (145,13) (232,51) (159,52) (248,26) (174,71) (244,57)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: Short run is defined as the two years following random assignment and medium run is defined as the third through fifth years following random. assignment
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Non-experimental Data
Control and Comparison Site
Riverside: 
Differences-in-differences
Portland:
Selection on observables
OLS Regression
Propensity-score 
subclassificationDifference of Means
Selection on unobservables
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7 Concluding Remarks 
In this study, we estimated the causal effects of a training program over the earnings of 
control and treatment group members using different econometric procedures. As a 
benchmark, randomized data were used in order to obtain average treatment effects 
estimators. Then non-experimental comparison groups were constructed in order to apply 
methods selecting on observables and unobservables. Thus, causal effects of training 
programs were calculated using both randomized and non-randomized data.  
We might summarize the insights from our research with three broad conclusions. First, 
results obtained using non-experimental data can lead to wrong conclusions about the causal 
effects of a training program. Second, biases obtained from non-experimental data depend not 
only on the econometric procedure used but also on the chosen comparison group. Third, 
comparisons longer ahead in time are more susceptible to selection bias problems. In other 
words, medium-run bias was larger than short-run bias. 
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Acronyms and Abbreviations 
Technical Terms 
ATE  Average treatment effect 
ATT  Average treatment effect on the treated 
CIA  Conditional Independence Assumption 
DD  Differences-in-differences estimator 
IV  Instrumental variables estimator 
OLS  Ordinary least squares estimator 
OVB  Omitted variables bias 
PSM  Propensity-score matching 
SSR  Sum of squared residuals 
SUTVA Stable unit treatment value assumption 
Data sets and variable names 
ABE  Adult Basic Education 
AFDC  Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
ESL  English as a Second Language 
GED  General Educational Development certificate 
Study and program names 
HCD  Human Capital Development approach 
JOBS  Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training 
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LFA  Labor Force Attachment approach 
NEWWS National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies 
TANF  Transitional Assistance for Needy Families   
Others  
CASAS Comprehensive Adult Student Assessment Systems 
FSA  Family Support Act 
TCC  Transitional Child Care 
TMA  Transitional Medicaid Assistance 
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Appendix A 
Supplementary Tables to Section 2 
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Appendix Figure A.1.- Labor Force Attachment Activities Sequence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Figure A.2.- Human Capital Development Activities Sequence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Job Club 
3-5 weeks 
Individual Job Search 
3-5 weeks 
Basic Education 
or Vocational Training 
Max. 9 months 
 
Work Experience 
3-6 months 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Basic Education 
6 months to 1 year 
(to 3 years) 
After 2 years, 
around 4% 
were still in 
any activity 
Vocational Training  
or College 
Max. 2 years 
Work Experience 
3-6 months 
Job Search 
8 weeks per year 
In need of basic 
education 
Want education Want work experience 
After 2 years, 
around 4%-8% 
were still in any 
activity 
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Appendix Table A.1.- Main characteristics of the training programs by Site
1 Treatments 
2 Assignment
3 Sample characteristics 
4 Enforcement and Sanctioning
a) Enforcement 
b) Sanctioning
Sanctioning characteristics
HCD and LFA
Three-w ay random assignment
HCD and LFA Employment-focused approach 
50% w ere w hite, 29% w ere Hispanic and 17% w ere 
African-American
Approved AFDC applicants and recipients w ere 
assigned to one of tw o groups. A program group 
(64%), elegible for JOBS services and subject to 
program participation requirements and a control 
group, not elegible for JOBS services and not 
subject to participation requirements. 
Majority of the sample w as w hite
Program coverage to parents w ith children as 
young as age 1
Program coverage to parents w ith children as 
young as age 1
Parents exempted w hose youngest child w as under 
age 3
High sanctioning Moderate sanctioning
Three-w ay random assignment (2 program 
groups and 1 control group)
Tw o-w ay random assignment (1 program group 
and 1 control group)
50% w ere w hite and 40% w ere African-
American
Federal JOBS regulations governed the rule enforcement and sanctioning process in JOBS programs nationw ide. The penalty for noncompliance w as 
removal of the JOBS-mandatory client from the AFDC grant. For example, if an AFDC case consisted of a JOBS-mandatory parent w ith tw o children, and 
the parent failed to participate, the AFDC grant w as reduced so that only the tw o children w ere covered. Sanctions w ere to continue until the sanctioned 
individual complied w ith the JOBS participation mandate, w ith a minimum sanction length of one month for the first "offense", three months for the second, 
and six months for the third and subsequent offenses.
Grand Rapids Portland
High enforcement High enforcement High enforcement 
Riverside
Moderate sanctioning
90% w ere female and average age w as 31
Individuals aged 18 or older Individuals aged 21 or older Individuals aged 18 or older
Single-parent heads of AFDC cases Single-parent heads of AFDC cases
AFDC applicants or recipients have a routine 
meeting w ith their income maintenanace w orker, 
w here is determined if the individual is required to 
enroll in JOBS. Those participants determined to 
be JOBS-mandatory attend a JOBS orientation 
w here the random asiggnment takes place.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
AFDC applicants or recipients have a routine meeting 
w ith their income maintenanace w orker, w here is 
determined if the individual is required to enroll in 
JOBS. Those participants determined to be JOBS-
mandatory attend a JOBS orientation w here they are 
evaluated to determine w hether they require basic
education. Those w ho had a high school diploma or 
GED, or scored 215 or above on both the math and 
literacy sections of the GAIN Appraisal test, and 
w ere proficient in English w ere randomly assigned to 
the LFA or control group. Those w ithout a high 
school diplome or GED, w ho scored below  215 on 
either section of the GAIN test, or w ho required 
English remediation, w ere randomly assigned to the 
HCD, LFA and control group. 
Single-parent heads of AFDC cases
96% w ere female and average age w as 31 93% w ere female and average age w as 30
For a three-person family in 1993, a sanction 
w ould have resulted in a $88 decrease in a 
monthly grant of $474.
For a three-person family in 1993, a sanction w ould 
have resulted in a $120 decrease in a monthly grant 
of $624.
For a three-person family in 1993, a sanction 
w ould have resulted in a $142 decrease in a 
monthly grant of $460.
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Appendix Table A.1 (continued) 
 
 
HCD LFA HCD LFA
Referred for sanction b (%) 40,6 50,2 27,7 27,0
Sanction imposed b (%) 37,6 41,5 14,9 8,7
9,8 11,6 8,3 4,9
82,4 80,9 71,9 69,5
5 Support services
Child care
Types of child care
Reimbursement
NOTES:
a M DRC calculations from the Two-Year Client Survey
b M DRC calculations from M DRC-collected JOBS case file data
Participants w ho say they 
w ere informed about penalties 
for noncompliance a (%)
Average number of months in 
w hich sanction w as in effect b
67,6
Provided payments to licensed and unlicensed 
providers.  Riverside's reimbursement rates w ere 
calculated by the hour, varied by children's ages, 
region of the county, and full-time or part-time care. 
The full-time rates for children betw een ages 2 and 5 
w ere $2.15 for unlicensed in-home care, $2.23 for 
family day care homes, and $2.93 for child care 
centers.
Provided payments to licensed and unlicensed 
providers. Providers w ere reimbursed on an 
hourly basis. The Grand Rapids scale offered a 
maximum of $1.50 for child care provided in the 
client's home; $2.00 for child care in the 
provider's home; $2.10 for care of children aged 
2 and over in a licensed center; and $2.65 for 
care of children under age 2 in a licensed center.
31,9
Riverside
The maximum allow able payment w as based on 
the age of the child, the kind of care given, and 
the type of providers. In 1992, the maximum rate 
paid for care by a relative or in family day care or 
group home care w as $2.00 an hour or $371.00 
a month per child. The maximumrate paid for a 
care in a child care center w as $3.50 an hour or 
$450.00 a month per child.
JOBS legislation required states to guarantee child care to each participant w ith dependent children if child care w as necessary for the client to attend a 
program activity or accept employment. 
Child care assistance w as first handled by a local 
child care coordinating council (prior to June 
1993) and later by a special child care unit in the 
w elfare off ice.
5,4
Grand Rapids Portland
20,5
Child care and support services payments w ere 
authorized by JOBS case managers.
The JOBS program paid for four major types of child care: care provided by nonimmediate relatives aged 16 or over; family day care, provided in a private 
residence for not more than 6 children; group home care, provided in a private residence for 7 to 12 children; or center-based care, provided in a 
nonresidential facility, typically for 13 children or more. Center-based care and family or group home care may be licensed by state social services 
agencies.
Child care needs had to be authorized by the 
client's integrated case manager at the w elfare 
off ice. Clients w ere free to choose the type of 
provider and the specif ic provider.
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Appendix Table A.2.- Main characteristics of the training programs
 
Varied first activity
Grand Rapids Riverside Grand Rapids Riverside Portland
1 Goal
2 Focus
3 Strategy
4 Program activity components, sequence and emphasis
a) Activity sequence and emphasis
Prepare people for jobs that offer suff icient w ages and 
benefits to get them off and keep them off w elfare.
Welfare recipients should upgrade their skills before 
seeking w ork through basic education or vocational 
training. By investing more program resources upfront 
recipients w ill experience a bigger payoff in job quality and 
stability in the future.
Emphasized quick exposure to and entry into the labor 
market as the best route to earnings increases, job 
advancement and sulf-suff iciency. The LFA theory is that 
w elfare recipients can best build their w ork habits and 
skills in the w orkplace and move up to better positions, 
even if their initial jobs are not high-paying or particularly 
desirable.
Employment w as the primary goal
Emphasized full-time jobs that paid 
more than minimum w age, included 
benefits and offered room for 
advancement. Heavy focus on job 
development and placement activities.
The first activity w as usually job club, and the instruction 
and resources clients found there w ere uniformly 
designed to help them obtain rapid employment. Clients 
w ho did not obtain w ork after job club w ere usually 
assigned to short-term education, training, or unpaid w ork 
activities so that they could boost their skills somew hat 
and resume their job search as soon as possible.
Education-focused approach Employment-focused approach
HCD LFA
Fast track: clients ready to look for 
w ork (job club + job search) 
Majority of clients w ere assigned to job 
search (fast track).
Program group members attended a 
group JOBS orientation inmediately 
follow ing skills testing. Clients w ere 
selected by managers to attend 2 
service tracks (selection w as based 
on a variety of factors: employment 
history, educational status and 
personal goals).
The starting point w as an orientation that occurred inmediately follow ing random assignment. Orientation w as w here 
clients w here informed about their program group, and it w as w here clients began to receive guidance from staff 
about w hat they w ould do next in JOBS.
36% of the clients in Grand 
Rapids w ere assigned to 
basic education f irst.
Only those w ithout a high 
school diploma or GED w ere 
included in the HCD group, 
57% w ere assigned to 
basic education.
The HCD program begins w ith longer-term education and 
training, generally lasting up to tw o years. Job search and 
vocational training activities may be assigned if clients do 
not f ind employment through their education and training 
program or on their ow n initiative.
The LFA program begins w ith job search activities, 
follow ed by short-term education and training only for 
those unable to f ind employment during job search.If 
necessary, use the f irst job as a steppingstone to a 
better w ork opportunity.
Mixed services strategy: job search, 
education and training, and w ork 
experience activities. The program w as 
a blend of strong LFA elements and 
moderate HCD elements.
86% of the clients in Grand 
Rapids w ere assigned to 
job search f irst.
68% of the clients in 
Riverside w ere assigned to 
job search f irst.
Clients w ere encouraged to invest time in education or 
vocational training in order to prepare themselves for good 
jobs.
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Appendix Table A.2 (continued) 
Varied first activity
Grand Rapids Riverside Grand Rapids Riverside Portland
b) Content of program activities
Basic education: six-w eek General 
Educational Development (GED) class 
for people w ho do not have a high 
school diploma. Adult Basic Education 
(ABE) for  individuals w hose 
achievements are low er than required.
Enhanced track: clients not ready to 
enter the labor market (life skills training 
class + basic education classes) 
Individual job search: Right after job 
search, clients could use resource 
rooms and w ere assigned to a staff 
member.
Life skills training: Four- to f ive-w eek 
class involved examination of w ork 
history and vocational interest. Goal 
w as to prepare people for w ork and 
eventual self-suff iciency.
Individual job search: required clients to look for employment on their ow n, document the names of the employers they 
contacted, and report to a JOBS staff member each w eek on their progress. Number of employer contacts required 
of Grand Rapids and Riverside clients w as determined on an individual basis by program staff. It w as used for clients 
w ho had completed job club w ithout f inding w ork. Length of job club and individual job search w as eight w eeks 
maximum per year.
HCD LFA
In Grand Rapids, clients 
w ere encouraged to build up 
their reading, math, and 
vocational skills through 
basic education, vocational 
training or college. Basic 
education often meant high 
school completition classes 
rather than GED classes. 
Problem-solving skills 
applicable to the w orkplace 
w ere incorporated into the 
basic education curriculum. 
Small classes w ith w hole-
class instruction and 
individualized methods. 
Greater use of vocational 
training.
Riverside's program w as 
restricted to clients w ho 
lacked a high school diploma 
or GED certif icate. Thus, 
basic education w as almost 
exclusively the f irst activity. 
Classes w ere larger and 
more likely to use computer-
assisted instruction. 
Organizational context w as 
extremly employment-
focused.
Riverside w as the only 
program that actively 
developed jobs and referred 
clients to employers. Staff in 
Riverside at every level 
believed strongly in the 
importance of getting clients 
to w ork.
Job club lasted betw een 1 w eek (Riverside, including an in-depth comparison of w elfare and earned income) and 2 
w eeks (Grand Rapids, including career exploration). Clients attended these classes from 15 to 30 hours per w eek. 
Instructors tried to use classrooms and clients w ere told to come dressed as they w ould for a job and to show  up on 
time. Clients w ere taught how  to f ind job leads and complete job applications, how  to conduct a succesful interview , 
how  to prepare a resume and cover letter, and how  to identify and value their strengths and talents. The phone room 
segment immediately follow ed the classroom portion and the goal w as to have clients apply their job-seeking skills by 
calling employers, arranging interview s and submitting job applications.
Job Club / Job Search: Classes 30 
hours per w eek for tw o w eeks. 
Discussion of career goals, resume 
preparation, videotaped practice 
interview s. 
Basic education w as provided to clients w ho lacked a high school diploma or GED certif icate (or, in Riverside, clients 
w ho possesed these credentials but w ith low  scores). There w ere 4 major types of classes: high school 
completition, General Educational Development (GED), Adult Basic Education (ABE) and English as a Second 
Language (ESL).
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Appendix Table A.2 (continued) 
 
 
  
Varied first activity
Grand Rapids Riverside Grand Rapids Riverside Portland
Vocational training
College
5 Impacts
HCD LFA
Vocational training: the most 
common training programs 
included automotive 
maintenance and repair, 
business and clerical 
occupations, cabinet and 
furniture making, computer 
programming, cosmetology, 
electronics, nursing, 
refrigerator repair, and truck 
driving. Tw o-year programs 
led to an associate's degree.
Vocational training: short 
programs generally led to a 
certif icate of credit.
Work experience: unpaid w ork in the 
non-profit and private sector, on-the-
job training in the private sector and 
paid w ork. Participation w as voluntary 
in unpaid positions, and positions lasted 
a maximum of 3 months.
College: limited to clients 
w ho could complete an 
associate's or bachelor's 
degree w ithin tw o years.
College: graduate degree 
programs w ere not allow ed 
in Riverside.
Work experience: included 3 types of positions: unpaid w ork in the public or private nonprofit sectors; on-the-job 
training in the private sector, usually offering a w age subsidized by the client's w elfare grant; and paid w ork, usually 
in the form of college w ork-study positions. Unpaid w ork experience w as more common than on-the-job training or 
paid w ork. Clients' assignments usually lasted either three or six months.
In total, over tw o years of follow -up, earnings gains 
matched or exceeded AFDC reductions for HCD high 
school graduates but w ere smaller than AFDC reductions 
for HCDs w ithout a diploma or GED.
Tw o-year reductions in AFDC payments exceeded 
earnings gains in both Grand Rapids and Riverside.
The net increase in combined income of 
the treatment group relative to control 
members totaled just $191 above the 
control group mean. Quarterly trends, 
how ever, show  that program group 
members may improve their f inancial 
situation in the future.
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Appendix Figure A.3.- Labor Force Attachment and Human Capital Development Participation Patterns 
Participate in activities 
LFA
HCD 
 
+ Child care / ancillary / transportation 
+ AFDC 
Reservation wage with medical benefits (without) 
Riverside: $7 ($10) 
Grand Rapids: $6 ($8) 
1.- Exit from AFDC (2 consecutive months of zero payments recorded on 
the state AFDC administrative records system) 
+ 12 months transitional child care / medicaid 
+ Can be off AFDC but on food stamps 
- No AFDC 
(earnings over $793 in Riverside and over $564 in Grand Rapids) 
2.- No exit from AFDC 
JOBS mandatory 
Employed + AFDC 
+ Income disregards 
1-4 months: $120 + 1/3 
5-12 months: $30 
12+ months: no disregard 
+ Food stamps 
Max. benefit level minus 1/3 of 
a household’s countable 
income (100% AFDC + 80% 
of earnings) 
Participating in JOBS 
+ Employment development 
plan 
No JOBS mandatory 
- Sanctions AFDC (cash, food stamps, medicaid) 
1st: 1 month min. 
2nd: 3 months 
3rd: 6 months 
= Deferred / unknown  
(working 30 hours per week or more) 
Exemptions: a good cause for failure to participate 
in the program or refusal to accept employment 
was employment resulting in a net loss of cash 
income 
No participation in activities 
3.- Exit from AFDC 
4.- No exit from AFDC 
Grand Rapids: $88/$474 
Portland: $142/$460 
Riverside: $120/$624 
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Appendix Table A.3.- Main characteristics by program, treatment group versus control group 
Mixed-strategy
Grand Rapids Riverside Grand Rapids Riverside Portland Grand Rapids Riverside LFA Riverside HDC Portland
1 Participation and Sanctioning a
a) Participated in (%):
Any activity 68,7 67,8 55,8 54,9 63,9 41,1 30,1 27,3 37,1
Job search 20,2 28,2 30,1 38,1 40,4 6,1 6,2 6,4 8,2
59,2 58,6 33,7 23,6 39,1 37,3 25,1 23,3 29,2
3,8 2,1 4,2 2,7 9,4 1,6 2,0 1,2 2,3
b) Sanctioning (%)
Sanctioned 32,3 22,1 35,1 15,2 18,4 6,7 3,9 4,2 4,4
2 Estimated gross cost per group member within 2 years after orientation (in 1993 US$) c
297 107 24 106 134 0 0 0 0
Job search 260 655 740 788 421 70 40 39 42
Basic education 1855 2103 736 155 488 713 95 163 303
2991 379 2403 848 1221 2297 596 367 1042
Work experience 191 57 110 50 222 11 58 27 33
Child care 542 164 366 88 1422 207 29 15 565
Total 6170 3540 4406 2082 4027 3298 819 609 2010
3 Impacts of the program d
a) Impacts on welfare status ($) average total payments received years 1-2
AFDC payments 6813 9235 6301 8385 5818 7639 9652 10369 7014
Food Stamp payments 3935 4391
b) Impacts on average total measured income ($) Years 1-2
Total earnings 4502 3278 4935 5386 7133 3916 4174 3090 5291
Combined income 
e
16886 16696
NOTES:
a M DRC calculations from the Two-Year Client Survey
b M DRC calculations from M DRC-collected JOBS case file data
c M DRC calculations based on fiscal and participation data from Grand Rapids, Riverside and Oregon; in all three sites co llected JOBS case file data and the M DRC Two-Year Client Survey. 
  M DRC child care calculations from Fulton County, M ichigan, and Riverside County payment data. Other support service data from county records.
d M DRC calculations from M ichigan, California and Oregon unemployment insurance (UI) earnings records and AFDC records.
e "Combined income" is income from earnings, AFDC, and Food Stamps.
Education or training 
activity
Work experience or on-
the-job training
Orientation and 
assesment
Vocational training and 
college
Education-focused approach Employment-focused approach
Control GroupHDC LFA
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Appendix Figure A.4.- Control Group Participation Patterns 
 
 
CONTROL 
Participate on their own initiative in training and education programs 
(control group could not enter the program being evaluated but could receive any services that 
existed prior to the introduction of the welfare-to-work program) 
+ Child care (transportation in Grand Rapids) 
If they participate in an approved activity, they get child care 
No participation in activities 
= No sanctions 
+ Continue on AFDC 
Exit from AFDC 
No exit from 
AFDC 
Employed + AFDC 
AFDC 
Exit from AFDC 
No exit from AFDC 
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Appendix Table B.1.- Selected characteristics of female sample members with two years of earnings data prior 
to random assignment, Grand Rapids. 
Characteristic Control LFA HCD LFA-Control HCD-Control
Earnings, welfare payments and employment
Employed in year prior randomization 0,4914 0,4846 0,5054 -0,0068 0,0141
(0,5001) (0,4999) (0,5001) (0,0186) (0,0187)
Earnings in year prior randomization 1610,2160 1434,3620 1714,0240 -175,8534 103,8086
(3531,5300) (2901,9900) (3901,5420) (120,1202) (139,2868)
Received AFDC during year prior randomization 0,8403 0,8215 0,8130 -0,0188 -0,0273*
(0,3665) (0,3831) (0,3900) (0,0140) (0,0142)
Monthly AFDC received in year prior to RA 341,1914 326,9819 322,1477 -14,2095** -19,0437***
(184,5519) (186,5535) (186,7819) (6,9207) (6,9408)
Number of months received AFDC year prior RA 7,8640 7,7973 7,6816 -0,0667 -0,1825
(4,8720) (4,9538) (5,0047) (0,1833) (0,1847)
Received Food Stamps in year prior RA 0,8892 0,8718 0,8611 -0,0174 -0,0281**
(0,3140) (0,3344) (0,3459) (0,0121) (0,0124)
Monthly Food Stamps received 188,8885 183,4262 181,8963 -5,4623 -6,9921**
(90,6388) (94,1922) (96,1581) (3,4491) (3,4954)
8,3791 8,3175 8,1782 -0,0617 -0,2010
(4,5547) (4,7257) (4,7640) (0,1732) (0,1743)
Demographic Characteristics
Single parent, ever married 0,4176 0,4013 0,4027 -0,0162 -0,0149
(0,4933) (0,4903) (0,4906) (0,0183) (0,0184)
One child 0,4561 0,4741 0,4586 0,0180 0,0025
(0,4982) (0,4995) (0,4985) (0,0186) (0,0186)
Two children 0,3583 0,3465 0,3602 -0,0117 0,0020
(0,4797) (0,4760) (0,4802) (0,0178) (0,0179)
Three or more children 0,1856 0,1793 0,1811 -0,0063 -0,0045
(0,3889) (0,3837) (0,3853) (0,0144) (0,0145)
Any child 0-5 years old 0,6921 0,6971 0,6832 0,0050 -0,0089
(0,4618) (0,4597) (0,4654) (0,0172) (0,0173)
Black 0,4086 0,4047 0,3726 -0,0039 -0,0360**
(0,4918) (0,4910) (0,4837) (0,0183) (0,0182)
Not black or white 0,1101 0,1074 0,1064 -0,0027 -0,0037
(0,3131) (0,3097) (0,3084) (0,0116) (0,0116)
Age at random assignment 29,6547 29,5772 29,8171 -0,0775 0,1624
(6,4833) (6,4624) (6,5897) (0,2414) (0,2444)
High school diploma or GED 0,5928 0,5779 0,6003 -0,0150 0,0075
(0,4915) (0,4941) (0,4900) (0,0184) (0,0183)
Sample size 1390 1490 1476
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
All dollar amounts are in 1996 dollars.
Number of months receiving Food Stamps prior 
random assignment
Grand Rapids
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Appendix Table B.2.- Selected characteristics of female sample members with two years of earnings data prior 
to random assignment, Riverside in need of  education. 
Characteristic Control LFA HCD LFA-Control HCD-Control
Earnings, welfare payments and employment
Employed in year prior randomization 0,3186 0,3300 0,3406 0,0114 0,0219
(0,4661) (0,4704) (0,4741) (0,0177) (0,0177)
Earnings in year prior randomization 1293,9310 1434,4850 1477,9020 140,5546 183,9714
(3173,1940) (3521,4580) (3479,3890) (126,7320) (125,6527)
Received AFDC during year prior randomization 0,7731 0,7680 0,7874 -0,0051 0,0143
(0,4190) (0,4223) (0,4093) (0,0159) (0,0156)
Monthly AFDC received in year prior to RA 440,8165 439,0804 444,4448 -1,7361 3,6283
(306,1994) (306,5155) (296,7973) (11,5760) (11,3672)
Number of months received AFDC year prior RA 5,9588 5,9908 6,1573 0,0320 0,1985
(5,1045) (5,1649) (5,1302) (0,1940) (0,1930)
Received Food Stamps in year prior RA 0,6893 0,6742 0,6762 -0,0151 -0,0131
(0,4629) (0,4688) (0,4681) (0,0176) (0,0176)
Monthly Food Stamps received 120,9689 120,1403 118,6112 -0,8286 -2,3577
(107,2307) (112,2407) (106,5796) (4,1487) (4,0309)
4,7868 4,8759 5,0000 0,0890 0,2132
(4,8399) (4,9014) (4,9504) (0,1841) (0,1846)
Demographic Characteristics
Single parent, ever married 0,6344 0,6438 0,6478 0,0094 0,0134
(0,4818) (0,4790) (0,4778) (0,0182) (0,0181)
One child 0,3543 0,3495 0,3574 -0,0048 0,0031
(0,4785) (0,4770) (0,4794) (0,0181) (0,0182)
Two children 0,3090 0,3004 0,3213 -0,0086 0,0123
(0,4622) (0,4586) (0,4671) (0,0175) (0,0176)
Three or more children 0,3367 0,3502 0,3213 0,0134 -0,0154
(0,4728) (0,4772) (0,4671) (0,0180) (0,0178)
Any child 0-5 years old 0,5917 0,5794 0,5768 -0,0123 -0,0149
(0,4917) (0,4938) (0,4942) (0,0187) (0,0187)
Black 0,1561 0,1650 0,1601 0,0090 0,0041
(0,3631) (0,3713) (0,3669) (0,0139) (0,0138)
Not black or white 0,4415 0,4394 0,4601 -0,0021 0,0187
(0,4967) (0,4965) (0,4986) (0,0188) (0,0188)
Age at random assignment 32,1676 32,4260 32,6014 0,2583 0,4338
(6,9445) (6,9123) (7,2866) (0,2618) (0,2685)
High school diploma or GED 0,2262 0,2348 0,2161 0,0087 -0,0101
(0,4185) (0,4240) (0,4117) (0,0159) (0,0157)
Sample size 1384 1418 1430
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
All dollar amounts are in 1996 dollars.
Number of months receiving Food Stamps prior 
random assignment
Riverside in need of education
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Appendix Table B.3.- Selected characteristics of female sample members with two years of earnings data prior 
to random assignment, Riverside not in need of education. 
Characteristic Control LFA LFA-Control
Earnings, welfare payments and employment
Employed in year prior randomization 0,4581 0,4542 -0,0039
(0,4984) (0,4981) (0,0177)
Earnings in year prior randomization 2645,8760 2245,3570 -400,5188**
(5016,3230) (4169,1280) (164,0885)
Received AFDC during year prior randomization 0,7481 0,7745 0,0264*
(0,4342) (0,4181) (0,0152)
Monthly AFDC received in year prior to RA 402,2361 403,6930 1,4569
(290,1048) (281,7797) (10,1758)
Number of months received AFDC year prior RA 5,4308 5,4864 0,0556
(5,0441) (5,0389) (0,1794)
Received Food Stamps in year prior RA 0,6516 0,6557 0,0041
(0,4766) (0,4753) (0,0169)
Monthly Food Stamps received 110,4156 111,5666 1,1510
(103,6211) (104,0292) (3,6946)
4,4099 4,4542 0,0443
(4,7590) (4,8514) (0,1710)
Demographic Characteristics
Single parent, ever married 0,6815 0,6865 0,0050
(0,4660) (0,4640) (0,0166)
One child 0,4180 0,4310 0,0130
(0,4934) (0,4954) (0,0177)
Two children 0,3402 0,3416 0,0014
(0,4739) (0,4744) (0,0170)
Three or more children 0,2418 0,2273 -0,0145
(0,4283) (0,4192) (0,0152)
Any child 0-5 years old 0,5711 0,5619 -0,0091
(0,4951) (0,4963) (0,0177)
Black 0,1802 0,1718 -0,0084
(0,3845) (0,3773) (0,0136)
Not black or white 0,2126 0,2135 0,0010
(0,4093) (0,4099) (0,0146)
Age at random assignment 32,0558 32,1636 0,1078
(6,7865) (6,7352) (0,2406)
High school diploma or GED 0,9987 0,9987 0,0000
(0,0356) (0,0355) (0,0013)
Sample size 1576 1583
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
All dollar amounts are in 1996 dollars.
Riverside not in need of education
Number of months receiving Food Stamps prior 
random assignment
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Appendix Table C.1.- Comparison between short-run and medium-run impacts measured using experimental and non-experimental data: Grand Rapids 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatment and control group Short Run Medium Run Short Run Medium Run Short Run Medium Run Short Run Medium Run
Grand Rapids (control) LFA 466,63*** 80,65
HCD 431,41** 228,10
Grand Rapids (Riverside) LFA 610,07 1707,17 939,82 2086,30 747,70 1859,83 1152,40 2246,93
HCD 574,85 1854,62 904,60 2233,75 712,48 2007,28 1117,18 2394,38
Grand Rapids (Portland) LFA 309,12 321,19 233,63 364,10 237,99 327,63 15,97 24,40
HCD 273,90 468,64 198,41 511,55 202,77 475,08 -19,25 171,85
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: Short run is defined as the two years following random assignment and medium run is defined as the third through fifth years following random assignment
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
All dollar amounts are in 1996 dollars.
Selection on observables Selection on unobservables
Propensity-score 
subclassificationDifference of Means OLS Regression Differences-in-differences
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Appendix Table C.2.- Comparison between short-run and medium-run impacts measured using experimental and non-experimental data: Riverside 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatment and control group Short Run Medium Run Short Run Medium Run Short Run Medium Run Short Run Medium Run
Riverside (control)
In need of education LFA 758,37*** 453,85**
HCD 323,92** 317,03
Not in need of education LFA 863,51*** 230,82
Riverside (Portland)
In need of education LFA 494,09 -888,20 171,90 1209,03 263,03 -1078,67 -378,07 -1768,67
HCD 59,64 -1025,02 -262,55 -1345,85 -171,42 -1215,46 -812,52 -1905,49
Not in need of education LFA 599,23 -1111,23 277,04 -1432,06 368,17 -1301,67 -272,93 -1991,7
Riverside (Grand Rapids)
In need of education LFA 614,93 -1172,67 285,18 -1551,80 477,30 -1325,33 72,60 -1712,43
HCD 180,48 -1309,49 -149,27 -1688,62 42,85 -1462,15 -361,85 -1849,25
Not in need of education LFA 720,07 -1395,70 390,32 -1774,83 582,44 -1548,36 177,74 -1935,46
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: Short run is defined as the two years following random assignment and medium run is defined as the third through fifth years following random assignment
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
All dollar amounts are in 1996 dollars.
Selection on observables Selection on unobservables
Propensity-score 
subclassificationDifference of Means OLS Regression Differences-in-differences
 
